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ABSTRACT 
The first year of the presidency of Donald J. Trump brought attention to Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, 
the constitutional provision that allows the Vice President and a Cabinet majority to transfer presidential powers 
and duties from a President who is “unable to discharge the powers and duties” of his office.  Although the ensuing 
media discussion included many thoughtful contributions, it also produced many mistaken assertions by scholars, 
journalists and other commentators regarding the importance, scope, operation, and effect of Section 4.  These 
mistakes are troubling because they may produce enduring misunderstanding regarding a provision designed to 
handle some of the most challenging, traumatic and contentious contingencies that might arise involving an 
incapacitated President and the transfer of presidential powers and duties to the Vice President.  The errors also 
might provide material for political actors and their supporters to cite and use opportunistically to frustrate the 
proper use of Section 4.  This Article exposes and corrects some of the mistaken assertions that have recently 
appeared in media discussions.  It explores a range of textual, originalist, structural, pragmatic, and other 
constitutional arguments to shed light on significant, but sometimes misunderstood, questions regarding the 
importance, scope, operation, and effect of Section 4. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It was anticipated that 2017 would bring attention to the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution.  That provision, which addresses 
presidential succession and inability and filling vice-presidential vacancies, 
was ratified on February 10, 1967, which made 2017 its fiftieth anniversary.  
Golden jubilees invite retrospection.  They present occasions to look back, to 
reflect on, sometimes to celebrate, past events, even those that generally 
receive little recognition, like obscure provisions of America’s Constitution. 
The Twenty-fifth’s fiftieth seemed likely to present an opportunity for a 
multi-purpose reflection—part nostalgia, part review of the legislative 
process and the people that produced the Amendment, part examination of 
the strengths and weaknesses of America’s provisions regarding presidential 
succession and inability, and part public education regarding the 
Amendment’s four sections and the constructive role three of them had 
already played in ensuring presidential continuity.1 
Life has a way of upsetting plans, and it did in this instance.  Political 
events transformed the anniversary.  The Twenty-fifth Amendment received 
much, much greater media attention than anyone could have imagined, but 
most of the discussion occurred for unanticipated reasons and with an 
unforeseen focus.  Instead of addressing the three sections that had handled 
succession or inability contingencies or reform ideas, public conversation 
targeted the Amendment’s Section 4, which provides for involuntarily 
separating a President from the powers and duties of his office.2  Section 4 
 
 1 See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, Celebrating the 50th of the 25th Amendment!, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 
2017, 3:31 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/celebrating-the-50th-of-the-25th-
amendment_us_589e1bb7e4b080bf74f03bcc. 
 2 Section 4 reads as follows: 
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the 
executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to 
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of 
his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office 
as Acting President.  
 Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability 
exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a 
majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body 
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will be discussed more specifically below but, in essence, it provides a means 
whereby the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet (unless Congress 
replaces that group with a different body) can transfer presidential powers 
and duties (but not the presidency) to the Vice President upon finding that 
the President is unable to discharge them.  Section 4 also contains provisions 
whereby the President can seek to reclaim his powers upon asserting that he 
is not disabled and his claim can be considered, initially by the Vice President 
and Cabinet, and, if they believe he remains disabled, by Congress, before 
he resumes power.  What produced the recent preoccupation with Section 4 
was neither an interest in exploring the Amendment’s past nor an effort to 
improve it for the future, but a belief that present circumstances dictated that 
the unused provision should now be put to use.   
This unforeseen development was due, of course, to recurring questions 
regarding whether President Donald J. Trump was “unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office,” the standard Section 4 sets for its use.  Those 
concerns were aired even before his election and escalated during the first 
year of his presidency as scholars, legislators, and journalists used 
information age platforms to expound on whether Section 4 applied and, if 
so, whether it should be invoked.   
The unanticipated focus came at a cost.  The preoccupation with the 
Amendment’s one unused portion distracted from recalling the contributions 
the other three parts have made and from considering remaining gaps in 
America’s provisions for ensuring presidential and governmental continuity.  
Section 1 had formalized the long-standing practice that the Vice President 
became President (not simply acting President) for the remainder of the term 
upon the death of the President and had extended that treatment to 
presidential resignations and removals following impeachment, situations 
involving permanent vacancies where the same logic applied.3  Section 2 
 
as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore 
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration 
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.  Thereupon 
Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not 
in session.  If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written 
declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is 
required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue 
to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers 
and duties of his office. 
  U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.  Although Section 4 allows Congress to replace the “principal 
officers of the executive departments” (i.e., the Cabinet) with some “other body,” Congress has not 
done so and accordingly this Article will generally discuss Section 4 as involving the Vice President 
and the “principal officers” as the decision-makers.  See infra Section II.D. 
 3 See Joel K. Goldstein, History and Constitutional Interpretation: Some Lessons from the Vice Presidency, 69 
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recognized the enhanced importance of the vice presidency and created an 
intra-term means to fill a vice-presidential vacancy rather than having to wait 
for the next quadrennial election.4  That provision had facilitated the 
impeachment process that led to the resignation of Richard M. Nixon in 1974 
by providing a vehicle to fill the vacancy caused by Vice President Spiro T. 
Agnew’s resignation in 1973 with a Republican, thereby preventing a shift in 
partisan control of the White House which would have otherwise occurred 
since the line of succession placed a  Democratic Speaker of the House of 
Representatives next in line of succession.5  And Section 3 had provided a 
mechanism whereby presidents could voluntarily transfer presidential powers 
for finite periods of time prior to planned surgery or for other such 
incapacities.  Two presidents had done so on three occasions,6 and four others 
had planned to do so if medical procedures required general anesthesia.7 
Distracting attention from this record was not the only, or even the 
primary, cost of the Section 4 obsession during the first year or so of the Trump 
presidency.  Although some media articles provided thoughtful discussions of 
whether Section 4 could or should be used to separate President Trump from 
presidential powers and duties, many made mistaken assertions about the 
Twenty-fifth Amendment, sometimes regarding rather basic matters.  
By “mistaken assertions,” I am not talking about conclusions on the 
ultimate question, whether or not Section 4 should be invoked regarding 
President Trump.  That topic is not the subject of this Article, and those 
 
ARK. L. REV. 647, 679 (2016) (noting that the first section addresses “presidential death, resignation, 
and removal”). 
 4 Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 505, 507 (1995).  
Section 2 provides: “Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of Vice President, the President shall 
nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both 
Houses of Congress.”   U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.   
 5 John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After the Twenty-fifth Amendment, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 932–33 (2010). 
 6 JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY: THE PATH TO SIGNIFICANCE, 
MONDALE TO BIDEN 255–59 (2016) (discussing transfers of power by Presidents Ronald Reagan 
and George W. Bush).  Section 3 provides:  
 Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written  declaration that he is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties  of his office,  and until he transmits to them a written 
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice 
President as Acting President.   
  U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.   
 7 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6 at 255, 258–59 (discussing plans to invoke Section 3 in Administrations 
of Presidents Jimmy Carter, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton); Second Fordham University 
School of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession, Report: Fifty Years After the Twenty-fifth Amendment: 
Recommendations for Improving the Presidential Succession System, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 926–27 (2017) 
(noting discussion of  invoking Section 3  before medical procedures of Presidents Jimmy Carter, 
George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama). 
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interested in that specific question might prefer to read elsewhere.  The 
“mistaken assertions” rather related to misstatements regarding basic aspects 
about the history, scope, and operation of Section 4.  The errors sometimes 
related to matters peripheral to an author’s focus, sometimes in otherwise 
thoughtful columns.  Some errors may have been casualties of the tight 
deadlines and word limits journalism imposes, time and space constraints from 
which academics are often sheltered.  Some mistakes may have occurred when 
commentators rushed a short piece to print without having fully reviewed the 
record that produced the Amendment or the surrounding literature. 
The mistakes are troubling nonetheless.  Some communicated confusing 
and inaccurate information and created an enduring source of erroneous 
data and ideas.  Although this risk existed ever since the printing press 
allowed mass production of media and since old articles were available at 
newspaper and magazine morgues, at archives and on microfilm, the hazard 
has increased exponentially in the Internet age when information and 
misinformation is disseminated around the world quickly and when search 
engines can easily retrieve prior comments and columns in seconds.  Such 
mistakes may mislead not only contemporary readers but those who may 
access, rely on, and repeat the errors in the future.  The mistakes made by 
scholars are most troubling since journalists and readers may assume their 
assertions are based on expertise regarding the Twenty-fifth Amendment, 
and future decision-makers and their supporters may rely on, or 
opportunistically cite, inaccurate statements to support future behavior.  The 
mistakes also reflected, and contributed to, a misunderstanding of the 
significance of the contribution the Twenty-fifth Amendment represented. 
Worse still, the mistakes relate to the continuity of presidential leadership, 
a topic that clearly matters.8  The Twenty-fifth Amendment rested on a 
consensus that America must always have a functioning President in a 
nuclear age.9  The Section 4 procedures, though least likely to be used, cover 
situations that are most likely to arise in times of crisis and contention.  
Accordingly, the Amendment must be well understood.  Incorrect 
information must be discredited during normal times so implementation of 
the Amendment can proceed appropriately when the need arises for its use 
in what are likely to be times of some national trauma. 
 
 
 8 YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION: A READER’S GUIDE 5 (2018) (stating that “issues of presidential inability 
raise questions of the utmost gravity”). 
 9 Joel K. Goldstein,  Taking from the Twenty-fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring Presidential Continuity, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 964 (2010); Rebecca C. Lubot, “A Dr. Strangelove Situation”: Nuclear Anxiety, 
Presidential Fallibility, and the Twenty-fifth Amendment, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1175, 1176–77 (2017). 
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The mistaken assertions about Section 4 during recent discussions are 
significant.  For instance, it has been suggested that the presidential inability 
provisions were peripheral to the Amendment.  They were not.  Sections 3 
and 4 were of at least equal importance to the provisions dealing with 
presidential succession and vice-presidential vacancy.  Some have said that 
mental illness was not a primary target of the presidential inability provisions.  
It was.  The legislative record makes clear that the framers of the Amendment 
fully intended to cover that vexing problem, including mental illness that 
occurred independent of an attack or acute, physical event.  Some have 
suggested that Section 4 only applies when a President is unable to transfer 
power voluntarily, not when he is unwilling to acknowledge a disability.  In 
fact, the broad textual language and the legislative record make clear that 
Section 4 applies  to situations where a disabled President is unwilling to 
recognize and declare his or her inability in addition to instances where the 
President is unable to do so.  Some criticize Section 4 as ambiguous regarding 
who acts with the Vice President and in the standard it provides.  In fact, the 
record resolves most issues regarding the identity of the “principal officers of 
the executive departments” and any ambiguity in the “unable to discharge 
the powers and duties of” the presidency standard was deliberate and 
represented a preference for flexibility and a faith in future decision-makers.  
Contrary to frequent mischaracterizations, Section 4 does not provide an 
instrument to remove the President from office, or to transfer his or her 
powers permanently (although that could be the de facto result if the 
President’s incapacity is permanent).  And contrary to occasional suggestions, 
the Amendment’s text and legislative history make very clear that once a 
President is declared disabled under Section 4, the Vice President continues 
to act as President until some authoritative decision-maker (i.e. the Vice 
President, a majority of the Cabinet or “other body” empowered to act with 
him or her, or Congress), but not the President alone, determines that he or 
she is able to resume powers. 
This Article corrects some recent misstatements about Section 4 that 
might have credibility based on the commentator who voiced them or the 
platform from which they were expressed.  It does so by discussing the 
Amendment’s text, legislative record and surrounding history, and structural 
and pragmatic arguments.  As such, this Article offers a resource to inform 
future considerations of Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment by 
furnishing not simply an interpretive guide to some important questions but 
a source of constitutional arguments and historical information.   
This Article begins by outlining some of the discussion in the media 
regarding Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment in connection with 
President Trump.  It then presents some common mistaken assertions about 
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Section 4 and uses textual and structural arguments and historical materials 
to correct the record.  The final section offers conclusions. 
I.  MEDIA DISCUSSIONS OF DECLARING PRESIDENT TRUMP DISABLED 
Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment received little discussion until 
recently.  Although some scholarly works discussed it,10 the provision received 
virtually no consideration in constitutional law casebooks11 and its scant 
media discussion generally occurred when it was under consideration or 
ratified.  Occasionally, an ideological critic of a prior President would suggest 
invoking Section 4,12 but those instances were exceptional and sporadic. 
That has recently changed, thanks to perceptions in some circles 
regarding President Trump.  Discussion of using Section 4 began even before 
the 2016 election.  In August 2016, The Hill carried a column predicting that 
Americans would need to become familiar with Section 4 if Trump were 
elected.13  In another pre-election piece, former Senator Gordon Humphrey, 
a Republican conservative, argued that Section 4 applied to Trump and 
suggested that Republican electors abandon him.14  Only eight days after the 
2016 popular vote election day, David Frum, a conservative former 
speechwriter for President George W. Bush, predicted that Section 4 would 
 
 10 See, e.g., JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND 
APPLICATIONS (3d ed. 2014) (analyzing the sections of the Twenty-fifth Amendment); MANAGING 
CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT (Robert E. Gilbert  
ed., 2000) (discussing the Twenty-fifth Amendment’s history and the Amendment’s strengths and 
weakness); JAMES M. RONAN, LIVING DANGEROUSLY: THE UNCERTAINTIES OF PRESIDENTIAL 
DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION (2015) (explaining why Section 4 was not invoked in certain 
administrations). 
 11 See, e.g., PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 541 (6th ed. 2014) (including a one paragraph discussion of presidential inability in the 
context of discussing impeachment); JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, 
COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 271–74 (12th ed. 2015) (discussing impeachment and removal but 
not presidential inability); NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN B. ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 323 (5th ed. 2008) (including two paragraphs on Twenty-fifth 
Amendment); GEOFFREY A. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1656, 1660 (8th ed. 2018) 
(including no Index entry  for “Twenty-fifth Amendment” or “presidential inability”). 
 12 See, e.g., Charles Hurt, Opinion, Has the President Lost His Ability to Discharge the Powers and Duties of 
Office?, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/dec/1/ 
charles-hurt-obama-loses-gift-of-speech-in-paris-t/ (criticizing President Barack Obama and 
calling for removal). 
 13 Ben Brenkert, Better Brush up on the 25th Amendment if Trump Wins, HILL (Aug. 3, 2016, 10:05 AM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/presidential-campaign/290204-better-brush-up-on-the-
25th-amendment-if-trump-wins. 
 14 Gordon Humphrey, Trump Is a Creep, WKLY. STANDARD (Oct. 8, 2016, 2:08 PM), 
https://www.weeklystandard.com/gordon-humphrey/trump-is-a-creep. 
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become a topic of widespread discussion.15  Eleven days before Trump’s 
inauguration, the Washington Post’s liberal columnist Richard Cohen urged 
senators to question Trump’s Cabinet nominees regarding their awareness 
of, and willingness to invoke, Section 4.16 
The frequency and volume of such discussion increased in the Trump 
Administration’s early days.  Frum tweeted about the subject a few days after 
Trump’s inauguration.17  The headline for a column by journalist Heather 
Digby Parton on January 25, 2017, advised that Trump could be “deposed” 
via the Twenty-fifth Amendment18 and one over a CBS News explanatory 
piece the next day referred to “[a]n obscure way to oust an American 
president,” suggesting the novelty of the proposition.19  Eliot A. Cohen, a 
counselor in the George W. Bush state department, wrote during Trump’s 
first ten days in office that “[i]t will not be surprising in the slightest if 
[Trump’s] term ends not in four or in eight years, but sooner, with 
impeachment or removal under the 25th Amendment.”20  On February 10, 
2017, the fiftieth anniversary of the ratification of the Amendment, the 
Washington Post’s conservative columnist Kathleen Parker suggested that 
Section 4 could be used to separate Trump from presidential powers and 
 
 15 David Frum (@davidfrum), TWITTER (Nov. 16, 2016, 5:27 AM), 
https://twitter.com/davidfrum/status/798880228923871233 (noting that “Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution. Article [sic] 4.  We’re all going to be talking a lot more about it in 
the months ahead.”); see also Tim Marcin, How to Keep Trump from Becoming President? 25th Amendment 
Could Declare Republican Mentally Unfit, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2016, 11:37 AM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/how-keep-trump-becoming-president-25th-amendment-could-declare-
republican-mentally-2451687 (noting that discussion had started about Section 4  shortly after 
President Trump’s election). 
 16 Richard Cohen, How to Remove Trump from Office, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-remove-trump-from-office/2017/01/09/ 
e119cc36-d698-11e6-9a36-1d296534b31e_story.html?utm_term=.0aa71173d2b1; see also 
Lawrence M. Friedman & David M. Siegel, The Most Important Qualification for a Post in President Trump’s 
Cabinet, NEW ENG. L. REV. FORUM (Feb. 15, 2017), https://newenglrev.com/tag/david-siegel 
(discussing the importance of Cabinet members to be willing to fulfill responsibilities under the 
Twenty-fifth Amendment and the failure of senators to question Cabinet nominees on the subject). 
 17 David Frum (@davidfrum), TWITTER (JAN. 25, 2017, 8:46 AM), https://twitter.com/davidfrum/ 
status/824252174020517888 (stating “I wonder how Mike Pence’s 25th amendment  vote counting 
operation is going today.”). 
 18 Heather Digby Parton, Don’t Look Now: It’s President Pence! Donald Trump Can Be Deposed Even Without 
Impeachment, SALON (Jan. 25, 2017, 1:01 PM), https://www.salon.com/2017/01/25/dont-look-
now-its-president-pence-donald-trump-can-be-deposed-even-without-impeachment/. 
 19 Will Rahn, Commentary: An Obscure Way to Oust an American President, CBS NEWS (Jan. 26, 2017, 6:00 
AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/an-obscure-way-to-oust-an-american-president/. 
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duties.21  A week later, MSNBC’s Steve Benen reported on “scuttlebutt” in 
the media and on Capitol Hill about Trump’s capacity but cautioned 
Trump’s critics to “keep your expectations low.”22  Conservative columnist 
Byron York summarized the discussion but dismissed Section 4 proponents 
as “The Resistance.”23   
Just as some from the Republican right suggested applying Section 4 to 
Trump, some linked to the Democratic left debunked the idea.  In late March 
2017, Jeff Greenfield, a former aide to Senator Robert F. Kennedy and a 
prominent political commentator, dismissed the prospect of using Section 4 
against Trump as “misguided” and a “liberal fantasy.”24  Greenfield argued 
that it was “beyond absurdity” to think that Vice President Mike Pence and 
Trump’s Cabinet would deem the President unfit.  Moreover, Section 4 was 
an emergency provision which would be used for a President who was 
“unable to communicate, or curled up in a fugue state” but would otherwise 
be relegated to Hollywood scripts and novels.25  An explainer piece by 
journalist Evan Osnos suggested that absent an unconscious President, use 
of Section 4 could be viewed as a coup and accordingly impeachment was “a 
more promising tool for curtailing a defective Presidency.”26 
Sometimes events intensified Section 4 discussion.  Shortly after President 
Trump fired FBI director James Comey, New York Times conservative 
columnist Ross Douthat lamented Trump’s unfitness but dismissed talk of 
Section 4 as “noise,” since it was unrealistic to think that Pence or 
congressional Republicans would act to transfer powers.27  But three days 
later, Trump’s behavior caused Douthat to change his tune.  A new column 
concluded that Trump lacked the characteristics needed in a President and 
 
 21 Kathleen Parker, Trump’s Two-year Presidency, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-two-year-presidency/2017/02/10/ 
32c2e4ce-efd9-11e6-9973-c5efb7ccfb0d_story.html?utm_term=.baa8e2e5f9fc. 
 22 Steve Benen, Why the 25th Amendment Is Suddenly Getting So Much Attention, MSNBC: MADDOWBLOG 
(Feb. 17, 2017, 4:02 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/why-the-25th-amendment-
suddenly-getting-so-much-attention. 
 23 Byron York, Opinion, 25th Amendment Chatter: Dems, Pundits Mull Ways to Remove Trump, WASH. 
EXAM’R (Feb. 17, 2017, 7:15 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/byron-york-25th-
amendment-chatter-dems-pundits-mull-ways-to-remove-trump/article/2615212. 
 24 Jeff Greenfield, A Liberal Fantasy Ripped from a Hollywood Script, POLITICO (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/25th-amendment-trump-cabinet-remove-
office-president-fantasy-214965. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Evan Osnos, How Trump Could Get Fired, NEW YORKER (May 8, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/08/how-trump-could-get-fired. 
 27 Ross  Douthat, Opinion, Donald Trump Does Not Surprise, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/opinion/donald-trump-does-not-surprise.html. 
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did not understand his office.28  Douthat now recommended that Pence and 
Trump’s Cabinet consider Section 4, although he acknowledged that the 
situation he described was not what the Amendment’s framers envisioned.29 
Around the time of Douthat’s columns, Professor Jamal Greene of 
Columbia Law School thought Trump’s “complete lack of trustworthiness 
and his manifest incompetence” as reflected in the Comey firing “may be of 
constitutional significance.”30  The Amendment seemed to envision that 
Section 4 could apply to a “lucid” President and Greene argued that “a 
compulsively lying President” was unable to discharge presidential powers.31  
Greene did not, however, expect Section 4 decision-makers to utilize that 
remedy,32 and others also thought its use was unlikely, impractical or 
improper.  Dahlia Lithwick argued that Pence and the Cabinet would never 
declare Trump disabled and thought the real problem was that someone with 
his qualities could be elected President in the first place.33  National Review’s 
Ian Tuttle thought Trump was a “menace” but argued that removing him 
via Section 4 would be improper and counterproductive.34  Bloomberg’s 
Jonathan Bernstein believed Trump unfit to be President but thought that 
the “armchair diagnoses” of Trump’s mental illness did not “clear the 
constitutional bar.”35  Impeachment and removal, not Section 4, was the 
appropriate remedy.36  Jeffrey Rosen provided a lengthy explainer piece in 
which he concluded that Section 4 made presidential inability a political, not 
medical, question which was to apply to “presidents who were clearly and 
unequivocally incapacitated,” “in other words, terminally ill, in a coma, near 
 
 28 Ross Douthat, Opinion, The 25th Amendment Solution for Removing Trump, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/opinion/25th-amendment-trump.html?_r=0. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Jamal Greene, Trump, Trust, and the 25th Amendment, TAKE CARE (May 15, 2017), 
https://takecareblog.com/blog/trump-trust-and-the-25th-amendment. 
 31  Id. 
 32  Id. 
 33 Dahlia Lithwick, Is Donald Trump Too Incapacitated to be President? SLATE (May 17, 2017, 6:17 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2017/05/no_the_25th_amendment_i
s_not_the_solution.html. 
 34 Ian Tuttle, Against the ‘25th Amendment Option,’ NAT’L REVIEW (May 18, 2017, 8:00 AM),  
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/447731/25th-amendment-donald-trump-ross-douthats-
argument-falls-short; see also Richard Brodsky, The ‘25th Amendment Solution’ Is a Terrible, 
Dangerous Idea, HUFFINGTON POST (May 17, 2017, 11:06 AM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-new-and-dangerous-republican-plan-to-
remove-trump_us_591c66a7e4b0a8551f3f84be (arguing that Trump supporters knew of 
“his personality, his infinite capacity for lies and self-deception” when they elected him). 
 35 Jonathan Bernstein, No, the 25th Amendment Isn’t the Way to Boot Trump, BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2017, 
7:39 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-05-17/no-the-25th-amendment-isn-
t-the-way-to-boot-trump. 
 36 Id. 
 
Oct. 2018 TALKING TRUMP AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 83 
   
 
death, or severely mentally incapacitated.”37  Columnist (and former George 
W. Bush aide) Michael Gerson thought America might have “an unbalanced 
president” but concluded that invoking Section 4 was “a practical 
impossibility” because it would require participation of Trump’s Cabinet.38  
Conservative Washington Post columnist Jennifer Rubin thought Douthat’s 
suggestion inconsistent with the true purpose of the Amendment and warned 
against medicalizing “amoral, stupid and/or illegal behavior.”39 
Autumn 2017 brought a renewed burst of Section 4 discussion following 
reports that Senator Bob Corker, the Republican chair of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, stood by earlier concerns about Trump’s stability and 
referred to the White House as “an adult day care center”40 and that 
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson had called the President a “moron.”41  
Jennifer Rubin thought Section 4 should not be invoked lightly and repeated 
the earlier admonition against medicalizing political disagreements but 
wondered whether President Trump’s behavior put the country “there yet” 
or “close.”42  Princeton historian Julian Zelizer expressed misgivings about 
using Section 4 to transfer powers from Trump but thought that further 
evidence that Trump was “psychologically unfit to handle the duties” of the 




 37 Jeffrey Rosen, The 25th Amendment Makes Presidential Disability a Political Question, ATLANTIC (May 23, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/presidential-disability-is-a-
political-question/527703/. 
 38 Michael Gerson, Opinion, How to Handle an Unhinged President, WASH. POST (July 6, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-handle-an-unhinged-president/2017/07/ 
06/88b2ec38-628b-11e7-8adc-fea80e32bf47_story.html?utm_term=.c31e6fddaeae. 
 39 Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, Let’s be Clear About What the 25th Amendment Does and Doesn’t Do, WASH. 
POST (May 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2017/05/17/lets-
be-clear-about-what-the-25th-amendment-does-and-doesnt-do/?utm_term=.11c2f640a157. 
 40 Philip Rucker & Karen Demirjian, Corker Calls White House ‘an Adult Day Care Center’ in Response to 
Trump’s Latest Twitter Tirade, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/10/08/trump-attacks-gop-sen-
corker-didnt-have-the-guts-to-run-for-reelection/?utm_term=.fbf7fdafb0c3.  
 41 Gabriel Sherman, “I Hate Everyone in the White House!”: Trump Seethes as Advisers Fear the President Is 
“Unraveling,” VANITY FAIR (Oct. 11, 2017, 2:40 PM), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/10/donald-trump-is-unraveling-white-house-advisers. 
 42 Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, When Do We Reach 25th Amendment Territory?, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2017/10/12/when-do-we-reach-25th-
amendment-territory/?utm_term=.a7e4a5ba0486. 
 43 Julian Zelizer, Is It Time to Talk About the 25th Amendment?, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/13/opinions/is-it-time-to-talk-the-25th-amendment-opinion-
zelizer/index.html (last updated Oct. 16, 2017, 10:02 AM). 
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Some concluded that conventional interpretations did not make 
Section 4 an instrument to use against Trump but favored its expansion to 
serve that purpose.  For instance, Professor Eric Posner of the University of 
Chicago School of Law wrote that the Constitution is defective because 
under the “conventional understanding” of the Amendment, a President can 
be removed if “incapacitated by mental or physical illness” but not if he had 
lost public confidence due to “a failure of temperament, ideology or 
ability.”44  Posner argued that its “broad language” deliberately transcends 
physical and mental incapacities and should be construed more broadly. 
Additionally, Posner argued that Congress should create a bipartisan 
Presidential Oversight Council to recommend removal for inability on 
political rather than medical grounds.45 
In mid-October Harvard Law professor Jeannie Suk Gersen described 
the activity of some medical health professionals who had organized “Duty 
to Warn,” an organization that claimed that Trump suffered from “incurable 
malignant narcissism” that rendered him unable to discharge presidential 
powers and duties.  In view of this unusual activity, she thought “talk of 
Trump’s removal under the Twenty-fifth Amendment may not seem so 
crazy.”46 
Law professor Jonathan Turley responded to arguments such as those 
Douthat, Posner, and Duty to Warn participants had made in two over-
lapping columns.  One argued that “removing Trump” through Section 4 
“would be a disaster for our system.”  Turley discounted claims that Trump 
should be removed for “incurable malignant narcissism,” since many public 
servants are narcissists, presidents should not be declared unfit without an 
examination, and Trump’s objectionable traits were evident before the 
November election.47  Bad behavior is not the test under Section 4, Turley 
pointed out; inability to discharge presidential powers and duties is. 
 
 
 44 Eric Posner, Opinion, Trump Could Be Removed for Political Incompetence – Using the 25th Amendment, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-could-be-
removed-for-political-incompetence--using-the-25th-amendment/2017/09/12/b6c62380-9718-
11e7-82e4-f1076f6d6152_story.html?utm_term=.0dbf9e5eeb66 . 
 45 Id. 
 46 Jeannie Suk Gersen, How Anti-Trump Psychiatrists Are Mobilizing Behind the Twenty-fifth Amendment, NEW 
YORKER (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-anti-trump-
psychiatrists-are-mobilizing-behind-the-twenty-fifth-amendment. 
 47 Jonathan Turley, How Do You Get Rid of Trump? An Election, Not the 25th Amendment, WASH. POST (Oct. 
19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/10/19/how-do-
you-get-rid-of-trump-an-election-not-the-25th-
amendment/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6052a3d59ca9.   
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A second Turley column said the growing “25 and over” club saw 
Section 4 “as a way to prematurely . . . end” Trump’s Administration by 
declaring Trump mentally ill and “thus unfit to hold office.”48  Turley 
derided the idea that Pence and a Cabinet majority would declare Trump 
disabled but his column mostly attacked the propriety, not the plausibility, of 
using Section 4.49  Among other points, he observed  that  authoritarian 
regimes deploy allegations of mental illness as a political weapon and argued 
that mental illness should not be diagnosed without an examination, 
concluded that evidence of Trump’s mental illness was lacking, and noted 
that mental illness is not necessarily disabling nor is it a justification for  
“removal” under Section 4 which requires a finding that the President is 
unable to discharge presidential powers and duties.50 
The debate continued.  The distinguished presidential historian, Robert 
Dallek, shared Posner’s belief that Section 4 should be construed to extend 
beyond the maladies that inspired its creation.  He wrote in December 2017 
that Trump should be declared unable to discharge the powers and duties of 
his office based on an expanded conception of Section 4 which looks to his 
level of competence rather than for a medical impairment.  Dallek contended 
that Trump is untrustworthy, lies, and has credibly been accused of sexual 
misconduct.51  By December 2017, Section 4 was receiving so much attention 
that the New York Times ran an opinion piece recommending various books 
dealing with presidential inability as holiday gifts.52  
The publication in January 2018 of Michael Wolff’s Fire and Fury: Inside 
the Trump White House, with its report that Trump insiders discussed Trump’s 
fitness, triggered another round of Section 4 discussion.  President Trump 
tweeted about his “mental stability” and termed himself a genius . . . and a 
very stable genius at that!”53  Jennifer Rubin now questioned the President’s 
fitness and declared that Pence, the Cabinet, and Congress “have a moral 
and constitutional obligation to bring this to a stop.”54  In January 2018, 
 
 48 Jonathan Turley, Opinion, Sorry Folks, Trump Is Not Insane, HILL (Oct. 24, 2017, 10:00 AM), 
http://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/356842-trump-pales-in-comparison-to-our-history-of-
mentally-ill-presidents. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Robert Dallek, Is Trump Unfit for Office? The Constitution Says Yes, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 16, 2017, 6:00 
AM), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-25th-amendment-constitution-750157. 
 52 Sarah Vowell, Opinion, Presidential Incapacity: A Holiday Gift Guide, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/opinion/trump-holiday-gift-guide.html. 
 53 Andrew Restuccia & Craig Howie, Trump Defends Mental Health: ‘I’m a Stable Genius,’ POLITICO (Jan. 
6, 2018, 7:42 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/06/trump-wolff-mental-health-
327116. 
 54 Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, The ‘Stable Genius’ Isn’t Even Functioning as President, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 
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CNN’s Byron Wolf noted that the Amendment was “back in the news” but 
thought it “hard to imagine” that the decision-makers would invoke it against 
Trump.55  But constitutional scholar Mark Graber argued that Trump was 
“constitutionally unfit” to serve as President, that Section 4 did not turn on 
physical or medical disability, that Trump was a “congenital liar and a 
bigot,” and as such he was “unable to discharge the powers and duties of [the 
presidency].”56  Law professor Michael Ramsey rejected Graber’s analysis, 
which, he said, conflated “unfit” with “unable.”  Section 4 covered the latter, 
not the former, he argued.57 
Media discussion of Section 4 in connection with Trump subsided after 
Trump’s White House physician, Dr. Ronny Jackson, issued a glowing 
report of Trump’s physical and cognitive health in mid-January 2018.58  Yet 
the topic returned to prominence in early September 2018 when an 
anonymous writer, who the New York Times identified as a “senior official 
in the Trump administration,” contributed a commentary piece alleging that 
various officials, including the writer, had resisted Trump’s “erratic 
behavior” and that the “instability” Trump’s subordinates had witnessed had 
prompted “early whispers within the cabinet of invoking the 25th 




 55 Z. Byron Wolf, Removing a President Using the 25th Amendment Would Require a Political Apocalypse, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/08/politics/25th-amendment-would-require-a-political-
apocalypse/index.html (last updated Jan. 8, 2018, 1:12 PM); see also Will Rahn, Commentary: Why the 
25th Amendment Won’t Be Used to Remove Trump, CBS NEWS (Jan. 11, 2018, 5:59 AM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-the-25th-amendment-wont-be-used-to-remove-trump/ 
(arguing that use of Section 4 to transfer presidential powers and duties from Trump is unlikely); 
Editorial, Is Mr. Trump Nuts?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/ 
opinion/is-mr-trump-nuts.html (arguing that Trump was unfit to be President but rejecting 
Section 4 as the appropriate remedy). 
 56 Mark Graber, Taking the Text of the Twenty-fifth Amendment Seriously, BALKINIZATION (Jan. 12, 2018), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/01/taking-text-of-twenty-fifth-amendment.html. 
 57 Michael Ramsey, Mark Graber on the Twenty Fifth Amendment, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Jan. 15, 2018), 
http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2018/01/mark-graber-on-the-twenty-
fifth-amendmentmichael-ramsey.html. 
 58 Dan Merica, Dr. Ronny Jackson’s Glowing Bill of Health for Trump, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/16/politics/dr-ronny-jackson-donald-trump-clean-bill-of-
health/index.html (last updated Jan. 16, 2018, 11:03 PM).  President Trump subsequently 
nominated Dr. Jackson to be Secretary of Veterans Affairs.  Veterans Affairs Pick Ronny Jackson 
Impressed Trump After He Gave Glowing Health Report, CBSNEWS (Mar. 29, 2018, 7:40 AM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/veterans-affairs-pick-ronny-jackson-impressed-trump-after-he-
gave-glowing-health-report/.  But Dr. Jackson withdrew after his nomination became controversial 
amidst allegations of improprieties.  Jessica Taylor, Ronny Jackson Withdraws as VA Nominee, NPR 
(Apr. 26, 2018, 8:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/26/605471807/dr-ronny-jackson-
withdraws-as-va-nominee. 
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“constitutional crisis.”59  Various senior officials in the Trump 
Administration denied authorship60 and that any discussion of using 
Section 4 had occurred.61  Scholars and journalists produced another round 
of explainer and commentary pieces about the Twenty-fifth Amendment or 
Section 4.62 
II.  SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 
Although the  media treatments provided some astute insights, some also 
included mistakes regarding the history, scope, and operation of Section 4.  
The discussion below seeks to correct the record on some important points 
that may become relevant in the future.  
Before presenting this discussion, it is worth saying something about the 
methodology used.  Some of the mistaken statements addressed the behavior 
of the framers of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, whereas others made claims 
about the meaning of Section 4.  The former group, which include the claims 
that the presidential inability provisions were peripheral and that the framers 
did not intend mental illness to be covered (although that assertion also goes 
to meaning), essentially involve statements regarding conduct and 
accordingly are addressed largely by presenting historical evidence of actions 
and words which demonstrate that the assertions are incorrect. 
 
 59 Opinion, I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-anonymous-
resistance.html. 
 60 Veronica Stracqualursi, Jeff Zeleny, & Jim Acosta, Here Are the Administration Officials Who Deny They 
Wrote the New York Times Op-ed, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/06/politics/trump-officials-
denials-nyt-op-ed/index.html (last updated Sept. 8, 2018, 5:01 PM). 
 61 Helena Bottemiller Evich, Perdue Dismisses 25th Amendment Chatter, POLITICO (Sept. 7, 2018, 6:00 
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/07/perdue-trump-25th-amendment-talk-
811253; Quint Forgey, Pence Denies 25th Amendment Talks to Oust Trump Following NYT Op-ed’s Claim, 
POLITICO (Sept. 8, 2018, 6:31 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/08/pence-trump-
25th-amendment-op-ed-812295. 
 62 See, e.g., Alan Blinder, The Story of the 25th Amendment, According to the People Behind It, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/us/25th-amendment-trump.html (describing 
creation of purposes of Amendment based on interviews with three participants); David Greenberg 
& Rebecca Lubot, Stop Talking About the 25th Amendment.  It Won’t Work on Trump, POLITICO (Sept. 8, 
2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/09/08/trump-25th-amendment-
constitutional-crisis-219739 (arguing that Section 4 does not apply to current situation); John 
Hudak, How Donald Trump Could Tweet His Way Out of a 25th Amendment Challenge, BROOKINGS: 
FIXGOV (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/09/07/how-donald-
trump-could-tweet-his-way-out-of-a-25th-amendment-challenge/?; Michael D. Shear, The 25th 
Amendment: The Difficult Process to Remove a President, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/us/politics/trump-25th-amendment-anonymous.html 
(describing operation of Twenty-fifth Amendment). 
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Consideration of claims regarding the meaning of Section 4 requires 
making assumptions regarding proper methods of constitutional interpretation 
as well as regarding several related areas, such as the role of text and purpose 
in constitutional interpretation, how to perform originalist analysis, and the 
relevance of evidence of legislative history.  The literature in each of these areas 
is massive and resists distillation even in writings about such subjects, much less 
in an article like this one about an entirely different topic. 
The discussion below relating to assertions regarding the meaning of 
Section 4 draws from a range of modes of constitutional argument and 
justification including text, originalism, structure, consequentialism, ongoing 
history, and  judicial precedent.  These types of constitutional argument are 
among those that judges and other authoritative constitutional interpreters 
commonly use and enjoy widespread acceptance in the academic literature,63 
even though certain constitutional interpreters argue that some are entitled 
to priority over others.64  Recourse to a variety of constitutional arguments 
often helps shed light on constitutional meaning especially when multiple 
paths lead to the same result. 
The discussion regarding the meaning of Section 4 draws heavily on 
legislative history and accordingly implicates debates regarding the proper 
way to perform originalist argument, whether based on original intentions, 
original understandings, or original public meaning, and regarding the use 
of legislative history to shed light on texts.  Legislative history can illuminate 
the context in which constitutional text is produced and accordingly offer 
insights regarding meaning.65  Moreover, evidence regarding intent and 
purpose often helps discern meaning.66  The use of legislative history that 
 
 63 See, e.g., JOHN B. ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9–
21 (4th ed. 2012); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–9 
(1982); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12 (1991); CHARLES A. MILLER, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 14–28 (1969); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist 
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194–1209 (1987).  
 64 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 91–125 (2004) (advocating for an originalist textual interpretation); KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 1–17 (1999) (advocating that original intent is the most appropriate mode 
of constitutional interpretation); Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996) 
(advocating originalism as the only means consistent with judicial impartiality). 
 65 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudication, 90 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1753, 1761 (2015) (“Because meaning depends on context, in law as elsewhere, the 
history of the drafting and ratification of constitutional provisions often has vital importance.”). 
 66 Id. at 1763–64 (“In nearly all contexts, the identifiable intentions or purposes of a speaker function 
as an important indicator of the meaning of the speaker’s utterances.”); id. at 1764–66 (“Even those 
who recurrently reject claims that legislatures can have intention analogous to those of individuals 
attach interpretive significance to the widely shared purposes that motivated the adoption of 
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follows is consistent not simply with arguments based on original intent, a 
method which largely defined originalism67 until recently68 and which 
continues to be used69 although subject to some legitimate attacks in certain 
contexts.70  The discussion of legislative history also speaks to original 
understanding or original public meaning of Section 4, methods which now 
attract a wider following than original intent71 even as originalism still takes 
many forms.72  In particular, legislative history illuminates Section 4 to the 
extent its meaning is under-determinate by providing evidence of how 
particular terms were understood by those who drafted and proposed the 
clause and by shedding light on what the language meant to reasonable 
persons in the mid-1960s.  As such, the resolutions suggested below should 
be persuasive to those who emphasize text or originalism of various forms 
and to those who are receptive to more pluralistic assortments of 
constitutional arguments which consider text and originalism along with 
other conventionally practiced methods. 
 
constitutional language.”). 
 67 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1, 13 (1971) 
(requiring consideration of “framers’ intent”); Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: 
Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 464 (1986) (calling for “jurisprudence of 
original intention”).  
 68 See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609 (2004) 
(“[N]ew originalism is focused less on the concrete intentions of individual drafters . . . than on 
the public meaning of the text that was adopted.”) 
 69 See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2558 (2014) (citing the Federalist papers as evidence 
of the Founders’ intent); Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2263–64 
(2013) (Thomas, J.,  dissenting) (discussing Framers’ intent regarding the Voter Qualification 
Clause); McDonald v. City of Chicago,  561 U.S. 742, 768–69 (2010) (plurality opinion) (using 
original intent to show that the right to keep and bear arms was regarded as fundamental); id. at 
772–77 (using evidence of original intent to show that right to keep and bear arms was viewed as a 
fundamental right for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570, 636–37, 655–62 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (considering the drafting history of the 
Second Amendment in interpreting it). 
 70 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 212–13 
(1980) (discussing the difficulty in imputing an intent to a body whose members may have different 
intents); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1085, 
1087–89 (1989) (discussing the difficulty of determining the Framers’ intent since records were 
incomplete and some issues were not considered); David A. Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and 
Judicial Restraint, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 138–41 (2011) (identifying as problems for 
originalism ascertaining meaning and translating it into distant time periods).  
 71 See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 68, at 609–10 (explaining reasons for shifting away from focus on 
original intent). 
 72 See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 244 (2009) 
(describing disputes among originalists); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories 
Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 7 (2011) (“There 
are multiple strands of originalism, with additional versions proliferating as rapidly as law reviews 
can publish them.”). 
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Although some have questioned the value of legislative history especially 
regarding statutory interpretation, it continues to be used in constitutional 
interpretation.73  At times, the Court explains its failure to offer legislative 
history from the drafting or ratification of the original Constitution based on 
the absence of evidence,74 thereby suggesting its relevance where available.   
The argument for considering legislative history regarding the Twenty-
fifth Amendment is quite strong.  The legislative history is extensive and 
preserved.75  Principal architects reasonably understood that their 
expressions had weight76 and expressed themselves publicly on important 
issues thereby communicating not simply their intent but their understanding 
of important terms.  Their ultimate conclusions were largely consistent with 
each other and generally not contradicted by other participants.  The 
legislative materials were accessible to ratifiers, as were summations which 
were sent to them.  The legislative history provides a reliable source of insight 
regarding the meaning of Section 4 and other provisions of the Amendment. 
A.  The Central Role of the Presidential Inability Provisions 
The misunderstanding of Section 4 began with misstatements of the 
events that produced it.  In particular, some comments significantly 
understated the importance of the inability provisions to the Amendment or 
their applicability to mental illness.   
 
 73 See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2113 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing the 
Federalist papers as evidence of original understanding); id. at 2099 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 
legislative history at ratification debates to show original understanding); McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 768–9 (2010) (using legislative history to show that the Framers regarded the 
right to keep and bear arms as fundamental); id. at 825–27 (Thomas, J., concurring) (using legislative 
history to show an understanding that privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship included rights 
set forth in the Constitution); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 886–87 (1991) (relying on legislative 
report defining a constitutional term as “instructive” in “confirm[ing]”  the term’s meaning). 
 74 See e.g., Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2085 (noting the failure to including extensive legislative history 
because “the Reception Clause received little attention at the Constitutional Convention.”); Free 
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 517 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(explaining failure to cite legislative history since “[t]he President’s power to remove Executive 
Branch officers ‘was not discussed in the Constitutional Convention.’”). 
 75 YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, supra note 8, at 10 (noting the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment’s “unusually robust and accessible drafting and legislative” history and absence of 
other interpretive aids). 
 76 See, e.g., Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President: Hearing on S.J. Res. 1 Before the 
Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 15 (1965) [hereinafter 
1965 Senate Hearings] (statement of Acting Att’y Gen. Nicholas Katzenbach) (advising that terms in 
proposed constitutional amendment could be clarified in legislative reports or debates); 111 CONG. 
REC. 15,384 (1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that constitutional interpretation would 
consider “interpretations placed upon the measure by the Senator in charge of the bill.”). 
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For instance, Jeff Greenfield wrote that the “core purpose” of the 
Amendment “was not aimed at presidential incapacity at all” but was to 
remedy the recurring problem of vice-presidential vacancy.77  Greenfield 
treated presidential inability as simply “a second issue” to be addressed.78  By 
minimizing the centrality of presidential inability to the Amendment, 
Greenfield invited readers to infer that the provisions received relatively little 
consideration. 
The history reads quite differently.  Although the assassination of 
President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963, created a vice-
presidential vacancy and provided the immediate impetus for the Twenty-
fifth Amendment, the roots of the Amendment preceded that tragedy, the 
relevant context which produced it was more complicated, and its focus was 
much wider than filling the second office.  Far from being secondary, the 
presidential inability provisions were at the core of the Amendment. 
The work towards fashioning a constitutional Amendment to ensure 
presidential continuity began in the mid-1950s after President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower suffered a heart attack on September 24, 1955.  Eisenhower was 
hospitalized for about seven weeks, did not meet with his Cabinet until right 
before Thanksgiving, and was away from Washington, save for a few days, 
for nearly four months.79  The executive branch, under the leadership of 
Attorney General Herbert Brownell, began to study presidential inability, as 
did Congress.  Representative Emanuel Celler, chair of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, prepared a questionnaire which elicited 
responses of seventeen scholars regarding how to address presidential 
inability.80  A Celler-led House subcommittee held hearings on presidential 
inability in 195681 and 1957,82 as did the Senate Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendments in 1958.83  Eisenhower’s ileitis surgery on June 
9, 1956, and his stroke on November 25, 1957, added urgency to the issue.84   
 
 
 77 Greenfield, supra note 24. 
 78 Id. 
 79 JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 213–21 
(1965). 
 80 H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 84th Cong., PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY 1–62 (Comm. Print 1956). 
 81 Presidential Inability: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. to Study Presidential Inability of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 84th Cong. (1956). 
 82 Presidential Inability: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Study of Presidential Inability of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 85th Cong. (1957). 
 83 Presidential Inability: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 85th Cong. (1958). 
 84 FEERICK, supra note 79, at 223–27.  
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When it became clear that institutional constraints, disagreement on the 
merits of competing approaches, and partisan considerations85 would 
prevent Congress from acting quickly, Eisenhower entered into a letter 
agreement with Vice President Richard M. Nixon as a partial solution 
regarding presidential inability.  It provided that if disabled, Eisenhower 
could, if able to do so, voluntarily transfer power temporarily to Nixon as 
acting President, that Nixon could effect  such a transfer if Eisenhower was 
disabled but unable to act to shift presidential power, and that, in either case, 
Eisenhower could reclaim presidential powers when he determined the 
inability had ended.86  Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson adopted essentially 
the same arrangement.87  The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments conducted further hearings on presidential inability in June 
196388 and had reported Senate Joint Resolution 35 (“S.J. Res. 35”) to the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary that summer,89 a proposal quite different 
from that ultimately adopted, but the death in August of its principal 
Democratic sponsor, Senator Estes Kefauver, diminished its prospects.90  
The American Bar Association, which played a critical role in formulating 
and advocating for the proposed Twenty-fifth Amendment, had endorsed 
S.J. Res. 35.91 John D. Feerick, whose scholarship, legislative testimony and 
consulting, and ABA work helped produce and explain the Amendment, had 
published his first law review article in the area a month before the Kennedy 
assassination,92 and the New York Times ran Feerick’s letter on presidential 
continuity only a few days before Dallas.93  Feerick’s article and letter dealt 
exclusively with presidential inability.   
 
 
 85 HERBERT BROWNELL & JOHN P. BURKE, ADVISING IKE: THE MEMOIRS OF ATTORNEY 
GENERAL HERBERT BROWNELL 278 (1993) (citing misgivings of congressional Democrats to 
elevate the status of Nixon). 
 86 Agreement Between the President and Vice President as to Procedures in the Event of Presidential 
Disability, PUB. PAPERS 196–97 (Mar. 3, 1958).  Sarah Vowell’s criticism of Eisenhower’s action as 
“neither legal nor, in retrospect, judicious,” see Vowell, supra note 52, is unfair in that Eisenhower 
was acting to fill a gap pending legislative action.  Subsequent administrations followed the 
Eisenhower-Nixon model, and Attorneys Generals Brownell, William Rogers, and Robert F. 
Kennedy all certified to its constitutionality.   
 87 White House Statement and Text of Agreement Between the President and Vice President on 
Procedures in the Event of Presidential Inability, PUB. PAPERS 561 (Aug. 10, 1961). 
 88 FEERICK, supra note 10, at 54–55. 
 89 Id. at 54. 
 90 Id. at 55. 
 91 Id. at 54–55. 
 92 See, e.g., John D. Feerick, The Problem of Presidential Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve It?, 32 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 73 (1963). 
 93 John D. Feerick, Letter to the Editor, Fixing Presidential Succession, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1963, at E8.  
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To be sure, filling a vice-presidential vacancy was a central purpose of 
the Amendment.  Senator Birch Bayh, who succeeded Kefauver as chair of 
the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, regarded vice-
presidential vacancy as “[t]he most immediate problem” in December 1963 
when he began to focus on the issue.94  After all, the vice presidency was then 
vacant, as it had been on fifteen prior occasions for more than thirty-six 
years.95  The Presidential Succession Act of 1947 placed the speaker of the 
House of Representatives and President Pro Tempore of the Senate next in 
line,96 and many thought the current incumbents, John McCormack and 
Carl Hayden respectively, too old and not presidential timber, especially in 
a nuclear age.97  The common alternative to legislative succession, placing 
Cabinet officials, beginning with the Secretary of State, atop the line of 
succession, also had drawbacks.  Cabinet officials were unelected and often 
were area specialists, not the political generalists the presidency required.98  
The vice presidency had grown, especially beginning with the tenure of 
Richard M. Nixon,99 and many saw filling a vice-presidential vacancy as the 
best means to provide for presidential succession.100  Moreover, if the second 
office could be filled when vacant, America would be far less likely to ever 
need to call on a legislative or Cabinet successor.101 
The immediacy of vice-presidential vacancy did not, however, render 
presidential inability a peripheral concern.  Rather, the presidential inability 
provisions were central to the Amendment.102  The disability provisions of 
 
 94 BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION 32 (1968). 
 95 FEERICK, supra note 79, at 244. 
 96 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)–(b) (2006). 
 97 Goldstein, supra note 9, at 965. 
 98 Cf. id. at 1027 (discussing lack of democratic pedigree of some Cabinet members). 
 99 BAYH, supra note 94, at 23 (“President Eisenhower had since 1952 relied so heavily on Richard 
Nixon that the office of Vice President had soared to unprecedented importance.”); JOEL K.  
GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF A 
POLITICAL INSTITUTION 137 (1982).  See generally Roy E. Brownell, II, A Constitutional Chameleon: The 
Vice President’s Place Within the American System of Separation of Powers Part II: Political Branch Interpretation 
and Counterarguments, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 294, 342–48 (2015) (detailing the evolution of the 
vice presidency during Nixon’s tenure in it). 
 100 See, e.g., John D. Feerick, The Vice-Presidency and the Problem of Presidential Succession and Inability, 32 
FORDHAM L. REV. 457, 489–90 (1964) (explaining that  filling  a vice-presidential vacancy would 
best provide for a qualified presidential successor). 
 101 See Joel K. Goldstein, Akhil Reed Amar and Presidential Continuity, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 67, 71 (2010) 
(emphasizing that Section 2 minimizes the time in which the vice presidency is vacant). 
 102 See, e.g., BAYH, supra note 94, at 32 (“It was important, too, to deal with the problem of Presidential 
disability . . . .”); id. at 47 (“The first part of the general problem, and the one that had been most 
thoroughly discussed, was the area of Presidential disability. . . . Then I turned to the other 
problem: how to fill vacancies in the office of Vice President.”); id. at 117 (criticizing a proposal that 
did not address vice-presidential vacancy and presidential inability). 
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what became the Twenty-fifth Amendment had been in the works for nearly 
a decade.103  Sections 1, 3, and 4 of the Amendment, none of which addressed 
vice-presidential vacancy, were modified versions of proposals advanced by 
the Eisenhower Administration and by a bipartisan group of legislators during 
the 1950s.104  Even Section 2, the one part of the Amendment that addressed 
vice-presidential vacancy, was related to the presidential inability provisions 
which required a Vice President to be operative.105 
Presidential inability was an integral, not incidental, target of the 
Amendment which addressed presidential succession, vice-presidential 
vacancy, and presidential inability.  These three topics reflected a larger 
preoccupation with ensuring continuity of presidential leadership106 during 
the Cold War and especially in a nuclear age.107  Bayh stated the basic 
purpose of the reform effort in 1964, declaring that “the safety of the United 
States demands a President who is always capable of making rational 
decisions and rational determinations; and in the event the President is 
unable to make these determinations it demands that the Vice President be 
able to assume the powers and duties of the President, so that this country 
may always be in the hands of one who is able to make the necessary 
 
 103 See FEERICK, supra note 10, at 50–53 (discussing reform efforts during the 1950s regarding 
presidential inability). 
 104 See Joel K. Goldstein, The Bipartisan Bayh Amendment: Republican Contributions to the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1137, 1142–44, 1146 (2017) (outlining various legislative remedies 
introduced over the course of the 1950s which helped shape the Twenty-fifth Amendment). 
 105 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 4, at 536–40 (describing connections between Vice President and 
presidential inability provisions). 
 106 BAYH, supra note 94, at 8 (1968) (“During the first week of December, newspapers reflected the 
national concern over the problems related to executive continuity. . . . The problem was 
threefold.”); Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1, 8 (Jan. 
4, 1965) (“I will propose laws to insure the necessary continuity of leadership should the President 
become disabled or die.”); Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President: Hearings on S.J. 
Res. 13 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 
40–41 [hereinafter 1964 Senate Hearings] (statement of Professor James C. Kirby, Jr.) (describing 
presidential inability as part of and interrelated to the problem of presidential succession); 110 
CONG. REC. 22,983 (1964) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (describing the issue as involving “the 
basic structure and the basic transfer of authority of executive power, the office of the President and 
the office of the Vice President of the United States of America.”). 
 107 110 CONG. REC. 22,990 (1964) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (“However, in this day of nuclear 
power . . .  the safety of the United States demands a President who is always capable . . . .”); 
Goldstein, supra note 9, at 964 (“[T]he advent of the nuclear age and of the Cold War . . .  lent 
urgency to the subject of presidential succession and inability.”); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, 
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 448 (2005) (“In a nuclear world where each side in the 
Cold War had the capability of striking the other in a manner of minutes, could America afford to 
be effectively leaderless for even a short interval?  Could the nation risk the mere possibility of a 
shaky finger on the button?”). 
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decisions at the necessary time.”108  Bayh and others wanted to address other 
gaps that threatened presidential continuity, including vice-presidential 
inability and the line of succession after the Vice President.109  Ultimately, 
Bayh and others concluded that a holistic approach would be 
counterproductive.110  The more comprehensive the proposal, the more 
ambitious its targets, the less likely it was to succeed.  Instead Bayh and others 
decided to address the two most pressing problems—vice-presidential 
vacancies and presidential inability—and defer other issues to the future.  
The report accompanying Senate Joint Resolution 1 (“S.J. Res. 1”)—in 
identifying the dual and related purposes of the proposal—recited: 
 The purpose of the proposed Senate Joint Resolution 1, as amended, is 
to provide for continuity in the office of the Chief Executive [in the event 
that the President becomes unable to exercise the powers and duties of the 
office] and further, to provide for the filling of vacancies in the office of the 
Vice President whenever such vacancies may occur.111  
The legislative discussions relating to Congress’s action in proposing the 
Amendment consistently emphasized the related nature of the problems and 
the centrality of presidential inability.  Bayh described his initial proposal, 
Senate Joint Resolution 139 (“S.J. Res. 139”) as “an attempt to deal at one 
time with the closely related questions of Presidential succession and 
Presidential inability.”112  He said that “[e]very reason and logic and sound 
organization calls upon us to deal simultaneously”113 with the contingencies 
which might present a challenge to presidential continuity.  When the ABA 
convened a blue-ribbon working group to consider the issue in January 1964, 
its consensus statement, which both reflected S.J. Res. 139 and informed its 
further development, devoted most space to presidential inability.114  During 
hearings and floor debate, legislators and witnesses emphasized the dual 
 
 108 110 CONG. REC. 22,990 (1964) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).  
 109 See FEERICK, supra note 10, at 71–75 (discussing other issues ABA and the original version of S.J. 
Res. 139 addressed which were eliminated  to maximize support). 
 110 See BAYH, supra note 94, at 48 (describing decision to drop provision creating Cabinet line of 
succession after Vice President); Presidential Inability: Hearings on H.R. 836 et al. Before the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 57, 77–78 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of Sen. Birch 
Bayh) (explaining decision not to address simultaneous presidential and vice-presidential inability 
in proposed amendment); 111 CONG. REC. 3253 (1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (explaining 
decision not to provide for vice-presidential inability); 110 CONG. REC. 22,991–92 (1964) (statement 
of Sen. Samuel Ervin) (describing considerations which led to minimizing issues covered in 
proposed amendment). 
 111 S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 4 (1965) 
 112 109 CONG. REC. 24,420 (1963). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Constitutional Amendment Urged on Presidential Inability and Succession, 50 A.B.A. J. 237, 238 (1964). 
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purpose of the proposals,115 noted the interrelationship of the issues,116 referred 
to presidential inability as having greater117 or at least equal importance,118 or 
described presidential inability as the more difficult problem119 or emphasized 
the importance of addressing presidential inability.120   
 
 115 110 CONG. REC. 22,983 (1964) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (describing “[t]he problems of vice-
presidential vacancies and Presidential inability” as “complex and significant.”); see also 1964 Senate 
Hearings, supra note 106, at 1, 3 (statements of Sen. Birch Bayh) (discussing both issues). 
 116 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 67 (statement of Sen. Edward V. Long) (stating that the 
problems of succession and inability “are so intertwined as to be inseparable.”); id. at 115 (statement 
of Professor James McGregor Burns) (referring to “the twin problems of Presidential inability and 
vice presidential vacancy.”); id. at 128 (statement of Professor Paul A. Freund) (stating that 
Presidential inability and succession were “two distinct problems, but they are interrelated.”); id. at 
134 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Herbert Brownell) (referring to “[p]residential disability and 
the related question of presidential succession”).  
 117 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 25–26 (statement of Sen. Kenneth Keating) (stating that “it 
is many times more imperative to act in the field of inability than in the distinct area of Presidential 
succession” since Congress had provided for a line of succession but had not addressed inability); 
id. at 150 (statement of John D. Feerick) (describing presidential inability as “the most important 
problem” facing Bayh’s subcommittee and Congress); id. at 156 (favoring dropping the provision 
changing the line of succession after Vice President, owing to importance of addressing presidential 
inability). 
 118 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 93 (statement of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., President-elect of the 
American Bar Association) (describing the issues as of “equal importance”); Richard M. Nixon, We 
Need a Vice President Now, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Jan. 1, 1964, at 6, 10 (referring to “the equally 
important question of presidential disability.”); see also 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 76, at 11 
(statement of Acting Att’y Gen. Nicholas Katzenbach) (describing vice presidential vacancy as an 
“equally critical problem” as presidential inability). 
 119 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 17 (statement of Sen. Samuel Ervin) (describing presidential 
inability as “a thornier problem”); id. at 82 (statement of Sen. Frank Church) (referring to the 
“vexatious problem of disability” which “is a more difficult problem to resolve than any other”); id. 
at 232 (letter from former President Dwight D. Eisenhower) (stating that handling presidential 
inability was “more complicated” than presidential succession or vice-presidential vacancy); 110 
CONG. REC. 22,989 (1964) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (referring to “the equally, if not more 
vexing problem of disability which may occur in the office of the Presidency.”); id. at 23,001 
(statement of Sen. James B. Pearson) (“The disability of a living President poses a problem as 
difficult as that of succession.”). 
 120 110 CONG. REC. 22,987 (1964) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that “[o]ur obligation to deal 
also with the question of presidential inability is crystal clear” to remedy a “constitutional gap, or a 
blind spot.  We must fill this gap if we are to protect our Nation from the possibility of floundering 
in the sea of public confusion and uncertainty.”); id. at 22,992 (statement of Sen. Leverett Saltonstall) 
(stating that provisions regarding presidential disability needed to be clarified because “so much 
depends upon the continued and uninterrupted functioning of our Government”); id. at 22,994 
(statement of Sen. Alan Bible) (stating that “[t]he Government cannot afford the luxury of Executive 
inactivity because of illness or other inability in the Presidency”); id. at 22,997 (statement of Sen. 
Mike Monroney) (stating that the disability provisions were “vitally necessary, more so each day”); 
see also Feerick, supra note 100, at 498 (“The problems of the succession and inability are now before 
Congress for action.  Ideally, both should be solved, together if possible.  However, if anything is 
going to be solved, the problem of inability should be.  It has first claim for action.  It has been left 
unsolved for almost two centuries.”); 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 88 (report from the 
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The pertinent legislative reports  in the Senate stated that “the purpose” 
of the proposed constitutional amendment “is to provide for continuity in the 
office of the Chief Executive [in the event that the President becomes unable 
to exercise the powers and duties of the office] and further, to provide for the 
filling of vacancies in the office of the Vice President whenever such 
vacancies may occur.”121  The reports accompanying the proposals in the 
Senate and House spent far more space on presidential inability than on vice-
presidential vacancy.122  In the mid-1960s, some raised the specter that had 
Kennedy been incapacitated rather than killed, the constitutional system 
would have been ill-equipped to respond.123  The frequency of that argument 
made evident the preoccupation with presidential inability.  It surfaced even 
when addressing the traumatic, recent presidential assassination. 
Far from being a secondary purpose, the presidential inability provisions 
were an integral part of the Twenty-fifth Amendment.  In fact, the House 
was far more enthusiastic about addressing presidential inability than filling 
a vice-presidential vacancy which some members saw as an insult to the 
 
American Bar Association) (describing its “first and perhaps . . . most important” proposal as 
making clear that during a presidential inability, presidential powers and duties, but not the 
presidency, passed to the Vice President); id. at 235 (statement of former Vice President Nixon) 
(calling presidential inability “the major problem, and the problem that needs most urgent 
attention”). 
 121 S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 4 (1965); see also S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 2 (1964) (providing a similar 
purpose). 
 122 See S. REP. NO. 88-1382 (1964); S. REP. NO. 89-66 (1965); H.R. REP. NO. 89-203 (1965). 
 123 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 22 (statement of Sen. Kenneth Keating) (observing that “a 
matter of inches” could have converted Kennedy’s “painless death” into a “permanent incapacity”); 
id. at 61 (statement of Sen. Frank Moss) (speaking of a bullet “which wounds but does not kill”); id. 
at 67 (statement of Sen. Edward V. Long) (referring to the possibility that Kennedy were left alive 
but disabled); id. at 150 (statement of John D. Feerick) (“Had our late President lived, hovering 
unconsciously between life and death, there would have been no one clearly authorized either to 
say that the President was unable to make a major decision if one had to be made.  The 
circumstances surrounding the death of President Kennedy should have taught us that we can no 
longer afford the uncertainty that presently exists regarding the critical problem of Presidential 
inability.”); id. at 101 (statement of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., President-elect of the American Bar 
Association) (“Had the President been disabled so that he could not continue to discharge his 
immense responsibilities, a series of questions would have arisen.”); Herbert Brownell, former Att’y 
Gen., The History of the Problem, Remarks at the National Forum on Presidential Inability and 
Vice Presidential Vacancy (May 25, 1964), in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PRESIDENTIAL 
INABILITY AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL VACANCY (1964), at 2–5 (raising specter of Kennedy lingering 
disabled for weeks or months after shooting); FEERICK, supra note 79, at 20 (observing that “[o]ne 
wonders what would have happened if on November 22, 1963, President John F. Kennedy had not 
died—but had lingered on, unconscious for days or even weeks.”); James Reston, Why America 
Weeps, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1963, at 1, 7 (“[I]t was not clear again what would have happened if 
the young President, instead of being mortally wounded, had lingered for a long time between life 
and death, strong enough to survive but too weak to govern.”). 
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speaker.124  Both bodies spent extensive time on the presidential inability 
provisions, especially Section 4.  Indeed, when Bayh’s subcommittee 
reexamined the operation of the vice-presidential vacancy provision in 1975, 
Bayh and witness, Antonin Scalia, then the Assistant Attorney General for 
the Office of Legal Counsel, agreed that a decade earlier more attention had 
been given to presidential inability than to succession.125  The legislative 
record confirms their conclusion.  And most of the time on presidential 
inability related to Section 4. 
B.  Section 4 and Mental Incapacity  
Some recent commentators have either questioned whether Section 4 
applied to mental incapacity or suggested that its architects were primarily 
concerned with physical disability.  For instance, the distinguished historian, 
Julian Zelizer, wrote that “the drafters [of the Twenty-fifth Amendment] had 
physical disability in mind” not mental competency.126  Professor Zelizer 
complained of “considerable ambiguity in the language of the Amendment 
to challenge the circumstances under which it can be used (meaning to 
address the psychological rather than physical condition of a president),”127 
a statement that appears to reinforce Professor Zelizer’s question regarding 
the extent to which the Amendment addressed mental incapacity.  Ian Tuttle 
observed that “the [A]mendment arose as a response to specific, concrete 
episodes of physical incapacitation.”128  Professor Turley was quoted as 
saying that the Amendment was added “largely for physical incapacity” but 
because its language was “ambiguous” it left room for arguments that it 
covered mental incapacity, too.129  Professor Julia Azari acknowledged that 
mental inability was included, but wrote that “[t]he context” of the 
Amendment “was pretty clearly aimed at the kind of physical and mental 
 
 124 John D. Feerick, The Proposed Twenty-fifth Amendment to the Constitution, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 173, 186 
n.55 (1965) (describing resentment among House members at the widespread questioning of its 
Speaker’s ability to act as President). 
 125 Examination of the First Implementation of Section Two of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, Hearings on S.J. Res. 26 
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 53–54 (1975) 
[hereinafter Examination]; see also id. at 55 (statement of Sen. Hiram Fong) (“[T]he thrust of that 
amendment really was on disability.  We were looking to see how the President could regain his 
power once he was disabled, that was the thrust of that amendment.”). 
 126 Zelizer, supra note  43. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Tuttle, supra note 34. 
 129 Deena Zaru, Constitutional Scholars: 25th Amendment Talk ‘Premature,’ Unrealistic, CNN POLITICS (July 
4, 2017, 12:34 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/03/politics/what-is-the-25th-amendment-
donald-trump/index.html. 
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incapacities that come after strokes, heart attacks and bullets.”130 
Far from being an afterthought or a fortuitous beneficiary of allegedly 
ambiguous language, addressing a mentally incapacitated president was a 
prime objective.  The Amendment’s very text suggests its wider coverage.  
Section 4 speaks of the President being “unable to discharge the powers and 
duties” of the presidency, language clearly broad enough to cover mental as 
well as physical incapacity.  Had the framers intended a narrower focus, they 
could easily have made “physically unable” the trigger. 
The legislative history confirms that mental incapacity was a primary 
concern of the Amendment.  Its architects thought that most uses would 
involve planned operations or injuries or illnesses,131 but they consciously 
included mental inability as a principal target of Section 4.132  They 
recognized that the most challenging contingencies would involve mental 
incapacity and they spent a great deal of time discussing it.  And the language 
they used made clear that they intended to include mental illness which 
occurred independent of an assassination attempt or acute medical episode. 
President Johnson’s 1965 message to Congress in which he endorsed S.J. 
Res. 1 and its House counterpart, House Joint Resolution 1 (“H.R.J. Res. 1”) 
made their application to mental illness, including degenerative processes, 
explicit when he called for their adoption to protect against “a President’s 
incapacity by injury, illness, senility or other affliction.”133  The legislative 
reports accompanying the proposals specified that Section 4 addressed 
inabilities relating to “the President’s physical and mental condition.”134 
 
 130 Julia Azari, What Does Invoking the 25th Amendment Actually Look Like?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 19, 
2018, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-does-invoking-the-25th-amendment-
actually-look-like/. 
 131 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 92 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (predicting that ninety 
percent of disability problems would either be handled under Section 3 or would involve clear 
instances where the president had suffered a serious illness, like a heart attack that placed him in 
intensive care at a time “the Russians move missiles into Cuba.”); id. at 240 (statement of former 
Att’y Gen. Herbert Brownell) (predicting that Section 3 would cover most situations of presidential 
inability and that Section 4 would cover “the rare but dangerous situations where the President is 
unable to declare his inability.  Typical of these would be a situation where the President was 
unconscious, or where he was mentally ill.”). 
 132 See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 10, at 112 (stating that legislative discussions “most frequently 
mentioned cases” and “[s]ituations involving physical or mental illness” as rendering a President 
“unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office” or as constituting “inability”). 
 133 Special Message to the Congress on Presidential Disability and Related Matters, 1 PUB. PAPERS 101–02 (Jan. 
28, 1965) (emphasis added); see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 7. 
 134 S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965) (stating assumption that Section 4 decision by Vice President and 
Cabinet would follow “adequate consultation with medical experts who were intricately familiar 
with the President’s physical and mental condition.”); H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 13 (1965) (same); 
S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 12 (1964) (same). 
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During Senate hearings, various witnesses spoke of inability as including 
mental or physical incapacity.135  President Eisenhower, for instance, wrote 
that “[a] disability could be of different kinds, one caused by physical or 
mental illness, or another by an absence from the seat of government of such 
a character that would preclude Presidential decisions and actions in time of 
emergency.”136  He thought the only situation to be feared would involve a 
President who was “so mentally deranged.”137  Bayh said his proposal was 
intended to “deal with any type of inability.”138  Senator Roman Hruska 
repeatedly used formulations that communicated that the Amendment 
covered mental disability.139  
When Bayh testified before the House Judiciary Committee in February 
1965, he repeatedly mentioned mental inability.  He agreed that the problem 
was how to address a situation where the President became physically or 
mentally incompetent to handle the presidency.140  He acknowledged that 
“[t]he problem of mental disability . . . is a tough one” since “the facts are 
difficult to nail down” and thought the provisions relating to intra-executive 
branch disputes “would be implemented” in such a situation.141  If the 
President were “mentally incompetent” it would be incumbent on the Vice 
President and Cabinet to act under Section 4.142   
When the Senate debated S.J. Res. 1, several senators who played 
instrumental roles in constructing the Amendment made clear that it applied 
to mental incapacities.  Bayh referred to a situation involving a “deranged” 
President.143  Senator Ervin observed that Congress might have to decide a 
 
 135 See, e.g., 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 45 (statement of Professor James C. Kirby, Jr.) (stating 
that conflict between President and Vice President/Cabinet would “undoubtedly” involve “mental 
illness”); id. at 60 (statement of Sen. Frank Moss) (speaking of a need to have a President “who is 
physically and mentally able to conduct the duties of his office”); id. at 61 (speaking of President 
losing powers “through the unrelenting march of age”). 
 136 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 232. 
 137 Id. 
 138 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 76, at 20. 
 139 Id. at 22 (stating psychiatric examinations following involuntary removal might take longer than 
physical examinations); id. at 24 (referring to “insufficient mental or physical powers to continue in 
office”); id. at 25 (referring to “physical or mental capabilities”); id. at 33 (“The issue is simply 
whether a specific individual with certain physical, mental, or emotional impairments possesses the 
ability to continue as the Chief Executive or whether his infirmity is so serious and severe as to 
render him incapable of executing the duties of his office.”); id. at 34 (referring to “physical or 
mental faculties”). 
 140 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 54. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 111 CONG. REC. 3257 (1965). 
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challenge involving alleged “mental disability” of the President144 and 
thought a challenge regarding “mental disability” might require 
investigation145 and testimony.146  Senator Hruska foresaw questions relating 
to the “mental ability” or sanity of the President that would require 
psychiatric investigation whereby “psychiatrists” would need to report to 
Congress their observations and tests of the President.147  
The legislative record in the House of Representatives also made clear 
that Section 4 applied to mental inability.  Numerous members of Congress 
referred to mental incapacity as part of the problem the proposals addressed 
during the 1965 House hearings, and the comments included many that 
explicitly referenced, or were broad enough to encompass, mental inabilities 
independent of attacks or physical illnesses.148   
When the House debated the measure, Representative Richard Poff, an 
important architect of the Amendment, identified the cases falling within 
Section 4 as those “in which the President by reason of physical or mental 
debility, is unable to perform his duties but is unable or unwilling to make a 
rational decision to relinquish the powers of his office, even for a temporary 
period.”149  Poff described these cases as including situations where the 
President was unconscious or otherwise unable to make or communicate a 
decision to relinquish presidential powers or when “the President, by reason 
of mental debility, is unable or unwilling to make any rational decision, 
 
 144 Id. at 3278; see also id. at 3279 (statement of Sen. Samuel Ervin) (referring to President’s “physical 
state or mental state”). 
 145 Id. at 3278 (noting that “evidence would have to be adduced”). 
 146 Id. at 3279. 
 147 Id. at 3278. 
 148 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 53 (statement of Rep. Byron G. Rogers) (referring to Wilson 
incapacity as involving lack of “mental capacity”); id. at 54 (statement of Rep. Harold D. Donahue) 
(referring to “mentally incompetent” President); id. (stating that the “whole problem” under 
discussion was what should be done “when the President shall become physically or mentally 
incompetent to carry out the duties of the office”); id. at 57 (statement of Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr.) 
(referring to “mental competency”); id. at 58 (statement of Rep. Byron G. Rogers) (imagining 
commission with five psychiatrists); id. at 62 (imagining situation with “insane” President); id. at 141 
(statement of Rep. Willard S. Curtin) (speaking of a President who was “insane”); id. at 142 (speaking 
of a President who became “mentally incapacitated for a week”); id. at 144 (speaking of President’s 
“mental condition”); id. at 147 (statement of Rep. Basil L. Whitener) (speaking of President being 
accused of “being mentally incompetent”); id. at 148 (statement of Rep. Willard S. Curtin) (speaking 
of mental illness); id. at 181 (statement of Rep. William S. Moorhead) (speaking of a President who 
had a “stroke, a coma, or mental disability”); id. at 252 (statement of Rep. John V. Lindsay) (speaking 
of President “in an acute state of depression over world affairs”); id. at 252 (speaking of President’s 
“mental capacity”); id. at 254–55 (statement of Rep. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.) (speaking of 
possibility that same sort of “[mental] debility” that afflicted Secretary of Defense James Forrestal 
could affect a President); id. at 276 (statement of Rep. Jeffery Cohelan) (referring to senility). 
 149 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965). 
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including particularly the decision to stand aside.”150   
Other members of the House understood that Section 4 would apply to 
mental as well as physical inability.  Representative Durward Hall, himself a 
physician, argued for the relevance of medical expertise and questioned 
whether Cabinet members were equipped to “determine when association 
pathways of the human brain and mind, or even the emotions, were bereft 
of ordinary and expected continuity on the part of the President to the point 
of constituting disability.”151  Representative Robert McClory specifically 
referenced “any mental or physical incapacity”152 and situations where the 
President is “physically or mentally disabled.”153  Representative James 
Corman said “one of the things we are concerned about is mental incapacity 
of a President.”154  Celler observed that “[t]he President may be as nutty as 
a fruitcake.  He may be utterly insane.”155  Corman, after observing that 
mental incapacity was a primary target of the Amendment, warned that 
“when a man is mentally incapable, he is the last one to realize it.”156 
The Senate debate on the Conference Report included numerous 
statements suggesting that mental illness was a primary target of Section 4.  
Bayh said that a President “might be physically able” but “might not possess 
the mental capacity to make a decision and perform the powers and duties of 
his office.”157  When Senator Robert F. Kennedy said inability “involves 
physical or mental inability to make or communicate his decision regarding his 
capacity and physical or mental inability to exercise the powers and duties of 
his office,” Bayh agreed.158  Senator Ervin imagined a President suffering from 
“a mental disease,” yet the loyal Cabinet unwilling to declare him disabled.159  
Senator Albert Gore, Sr. observed that “[d]isability may be psychiatric.  It may 
be mental.  It may be a sort on which people would honestly have differing 
opinions.  A President might be physically fit—the picture of health; but to 
 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 7939. 
 152 Id. at 7946–47; see also id. at 7953 (statement of Rep. Jacob H. Gilbert) (referring to “President’s 
incapacity by injury, illness, or other affliction”). 
 153 Id. at 7947; see also id. at 7956 (statement of Rep. William J. Randall) (referring to “physical or mental 
incapacity”); id. (“The further idea that a President might actually be forced to step down 
involuntarily from office because of physical or mental incapacity is fraught with unpleasant 
associations.”); id. at 7964 (statement of Rep. Chester E. Holifield) (hypothesizing a President 
suffering a “nervous breakdown” and referring to his “mental condition”). 
 154 Id. at 7965. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 15,381. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 15,590. 
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those who work closely with him, there might be a conviction that he had lost 
his mental balance, that he had psychiatric problems.”160  Bayh recognized 
that Section 4 could be used if the President “although physically able, is not 
the man, from a substantive point, who was previously elected to that office.  
Thus arises the difficult problem of mental disability.”161   
The architects of the Amendment thought the rare disputes between the 
President and Vice President/Cabinet would usually involve questions 
regarding the President’s mental fitness.  Bayh stated that Section 4 disputed 
situations would “usually” involve serious doubt about the President’s 
“mental capacity.”162  In preparing for the conference committee, Bayh told 
his staff that the Section 4 provisions regarding a conflict between the 
President and the Vice President/Cabinet would come into play only “if the 
President was as nutty as a fruit cake.  Mental illness, pure and simple, is the 
only time this provision would be used.”163  Not only did Section 4 apply to 
disabilities involving mental illness; these were the occasions when its 
challenge mechanisms were expected to be used. 
Mental incapacity was clearly a primary, not incidental, target of 
Section 4.  The text of Section 4 is broad enough to include it and the 
legislative record demonstrates that mental disability was a deliberate target.  
The Amendment’s architects and numerous others frequently referenced 
mental incapacity in contexts which indicated their concern with mental 
conditions, including those which were degenerative or otherwise 
independent of acute events, thereby confirming that their intent and 
understanding coincided with the inclusive meaning of the language of 
Section 4.  Bayh and Feerick have subsequently confirmed the deliberate 
inclusion of mental incapacity.164  Even if a mentally incapacitated president 
would be a rare occurrence, legislators regarded it as a particularly vexing 
problem and one which needed to be addressed.  They discussed it 
extensively and provided for it. 
 
 160 Id. at 15,592. 
 161 Id. at 15,593; see also id. at 15,594 (statement of Sen. Russell B. Long) (recognizing Section 4’s 
application to mental incapacity). 
 162 Id.  at 3285 (1965). 
 163 BAYH, supra note 94, at 283; see also id. at 285 (referring to President who was “completely off his 
rocker” reassuming power); 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 45 (statement of Professor James 
C. Kirby, Jr.) (stating that President who insisted on his ability against contrary views of the Vice 
President and Cabinet would “undoubtedly” involve “mental illness.”). 
 164 See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 10, at 115; Examination, supra note 125, at 17 (statement of Sen. Birch 
Bayh) (stating that he introduced the Twenty-fifth Amendment in part to address “the potential 
problem of the temporary physical or mental incapacity of a President.”). 
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C.  The Scope of Section 4 
Recent discussion has raised questions about the scope of Section 4 in 
addition to  its application to mental inability.  Some commentators have 
complained that the presidential inability provisions of Section 4 are 
ambiguous in their coverage.165  This conclusion has led writers to reach 
quite disparate views regarding its reach.   
Some have suggested that Section 4 applies only when a President is 
unable to declare his inability, not when he is unwilling to recognize his 
inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office.  For instance, Scott 
Bomboy has written that Section 4 was “designed to deal with a situation 
where an incapacitated President couldn’t tell Congress that the Vice 
President needed to act as President.”166  
Some have accepted this basic premise and applied it to constrict the use 
of Section 4.  For instance, Professor Jonathan Zimmerman has asserted  that 
the authors of the Amendment intended Section 4 to apply only if the President 
was “absolutely and unambiguously incapable—like John F. Kennedy was, in 
the hours between when he was shot and when he died.”167  Jeff Greenfield 
argued that Section 4 would only be used for a President who was “unable to 
communicate, or curled up in a fugue state.”168  Jeffrey Rosen wrote that 
 
 165 See, e.g., Jessica Levinson, Opinion, Will the 25th Amendment Save America from Trump? Not as Written, 
NBC (Oct. 31, 2017, 4:10 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/will-25th-
amendment-save-america-trump-not-written-ncna815851 (“It is vague and broad.”); Zaru, supra 
note 129 (quoting Jonathan Turley as referring to the “dangerous ambiguity” of the Amendment); 
Joshua Zeitz, Why the 25th Amendment Doesn’t Apply to Trump—No Matter What He Tweets, POLITICO 
(Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/10/25th-amendment-
trump-216267 (identifying several points on which Section 4 “is ambiguous”); Zelizer, supra note 
43 (referring to “considerable ambiguity in the language”). 
 166 Scott Bomboy, Can the Cabinet “Remove” a President Using the 25th Amendment?, CONST. CTR.: CONST. 
DAILY (Oct. 12, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/can-the-cabinet-remove-a-president-
using-the-25th-amendment; see Scott Bomboy, Breaking Down the 25th Amendment: What You Need to 
Know, CONST. CTR.: CONST.  DAILY (May 19, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/breaking-
down-the-25th-amendment-what-you-need-to-know (“In theory, this clause was designed to deal 
with a situation where an incapacitated President couldn’t tell Congress that the Vice President 
needed to act as President.”); see also Adam R.F. Gustafson, Presidential Inability and Subjective Meaning, 
27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 459, 462 (2009) (arguing Section 4 applies only when President is “unable 
to make or communicate a rational decision to step down temporarily of his own accord.”); Brian C. 
Kalt, Letter to the Editor: The Twenty-fifth Amendment Reader’s Guide, JUST SECURITY (May 18, 2018), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/56280/letter-editor-twenty-fifth-amendment-readers-guide/ (“The 
bottom line is that while Section 4 can apply to all sorts of situations, it is only designed to work well 
when the president is unconscious or otherwise unable to communicate.”). 
 167 Jonathan Zimmerman, What Liberals Can Learn from Conservatism, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/146192/liberals-can-learn-conservatism. 
 168 Greenfield, supra note 24. 
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Section 4 applied to “presidents who were clearly and unequivocally 
incapacitated to the point of being unable to discharge their duties—in other 
words, terminally ill, in a coma, near death, or severely mentally 
incapacitated.”169  Conversely, as previously noted, others like Greene, Posner, 
Dallek, and Graber argue for a broader understanding of Section 4 that would 
encompass certain character flaws or even incompetence.  
Finally, some writers have suggested that Section 4 does not apply to a 
condition that pre-existed the most recent presidential election, at least if the 
electorate knew of it.  Historian Joshua Zeitz, for instance, argued that the 
Amendment’s framers did not “expressly foresee” that Americans would 
elect as president “someone already unfit to serve” and suggested that the 
Amendment did not or should not provide a “reprieve from our own 
folly.”170  Zelizer characterized using Section 4 regarding Trump as “a 
dramatic action overturning the election based on criteria that would be 
difficult to determine with any kind of certainty.”171 
The decision not to define “unable” or “inability” in the Constitution was 
intentional, not inadvertent,172 and the lack of a definition is not proper 
ground for criticizing the Amendment or its framers.  Representative Poff, a 
key actor in the House and conference deliberations,173 explained during 
House debate that the ABA and the House Judiciary Committee had 
“struggled with the question of defining the word ‘inability’” but “decided 
that it would be unwise to attempt such a definition within the framework of 
the Constitution.174  To do so would give the definition adopted a rigidity 
which, in application, might sometimes be unrealistic.”175  Similarly, Feerick 
explained the decision not to define those terms “reflected a judgment that a 
rigid constitutional definition was undesirable, since cases of inability could 
take various forms not neatly fitting into such a definition.”176  Feerick wrote 
that the terms “are intended to cover all cases in which some condition or 
circumstance prevents the President from discharging his powers and duties 
 
 169 Rosen, supra note 37. 
 170 Zeitz, supra note 165.  
 171 Zelizer, supra note 43. 
 172 See FEERICK, supra note 10, at 112 (stating that failure to define terms was not “the result of an 
oversight.”); Second Fordham University School of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession, supra 
note 7, at 928 (“The Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s framers purposely avoided a specific definition of 
inability.”). 
 173 Goldstein, supra note 104, at 1162–67 (discussing Poff’s role in the development of the Amendment). 
 174 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff). 
 175 Id. 
 176 FEERICK, supra note 10, at 112. 
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and the public business requires that the Vice President discharge them.”177  
The framers understood that they could not anticipate every contingency 
the future might present nor could they fashion a more workable definition 
than the standard in the Amendment.  They sought to leave future decision-
makers flexibility to handle situations that might not have been apparent in 
the mid-1960s.  In a Constitution that protects “liberty” and “due process,” 
prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments” and “unreasonable searches and 
seizures,” vests “executive power,” and allows impeachment and removal 
from office for “other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” the words Section 4 
deploys are not uncommon.  They are more appropriately described as 
“flexible” than disparaged as “ambiguous” or “vague.”  The standard used 
reflected prudence and humility and was not ill-considered. 
The text of Section 4 and its legislative history rebut efforts to limit it to 
situations where the President is unable to determine or communicate his 
inability.  Section 4 makes clear that it extends to a President who is 
unwilling, as well as to one who is unable, to recognize his inability since it 
applies “Whenever” the Vice President and other decision-makers make the 
prescribed transmission that the President is “unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of his office.”178  The broad language of the text makes the criteria 
turn on the President’s inability to perform his powers and duties, not 
whether the chief executive recognizes that condition.  Far from limiting 
Section 4 to situations in which the President is unable to communicate or 
lacked the opportunity to act, the text adopts a more capacious formulation 
that invites much broader use.   
The legislative record confirms that conclusion.  The congressional 
reports which accompanied the relevant Senate and House measures made 
clear that Section 4 applied when the President could, but did not, declare 
his inability, not simply when circumstances denied him that option.  They 
provided that under Section 4, “if a President does not declare that an 
inability exists, the Vice President, if satisfied that the President is disabled 
shall, with the written approval of a majority of the heads of the executive 
departments, assume the discharge of the powers and duties of the Office as 
 
 177 Id. at 112; see also Feerick, supra note 124, at 197–98 n. 135 (noting that the term “inability” was 
intended to cover a wide range of events); John D. Feerick, The Twenty-fifth Amendment: An Explanation 
and Defense, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 481, 502 (1995) (“[O]ne would be mistaken to attempt to 
define with specificity what constitutes an ‘inability.’  No set of definitions could possibly deal with 
every contingency, and the use of detailed language could create a situation where, during a time 
of national trauma, unnecessary debate occurs over whether or not the particular facts fit the 
definitions, or vice versa.”). 
 178 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
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Acting President upon the transmission of such declaration to the 
Congress.”179  In other words, Section 4 could be appropriate if a disabled 
President did not use Section 3, not simply when he was unable to do so.180  
In introducing S.J. Res. 139, Bayh described Section 4 as applying to “the 
situation where the President is either unwilling or unable” to declare his own 
inability,181 a formulation others adopted during proceedings in the Senate182 
and the House.183   
The legislative reports presented the undeclared disabilities of Presidents 
James Garfield, Woodrow Wilson, and Dwight Eisenhower as instructive 
instances in which presidential power should have been, but was not, 
transferred to the Vice President,184 and legislators invoked those episodes in 
their own statements.185  In some of those situations, the President was able, 
 
 179 S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965); S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 11 (1964). 
 180 See Operation of the Twenty-fifth Amendment Respecting Presidential Succession, 9 Op. O.L.C. 65, 66 (1985) 
(stating that Section 4 applies if the President is “unable or unwilling to transmit a declaration of 
his inability . . . .”); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 141 (2017) 
(stating that Section 4 applies when President is unwilling to recognize incapacity).  But see 
Gustafson, supra note 166 (arguing that Sections 3 and 4 are mutually exclusive). 
 181 109 CONG. REC. 24,421 (1963). 
 182 110 CONG. REC. 22,995 (1964) (statement of Sen. Alan Bible) (“What to do in the event a President 
is unable or unwilling to recognize his disability . . . .”); 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 44 
(statement of Professor James C. Kirby, Jr.) (describing Section 4 as addressing a situation where 
the President “was unable to communicate . . . or where the President suffered from an inability of 
which he was not aware or would not admit.”); id. at 151 (statement of John D. Feerick) (describing 
ABA consensus as empowering the Vice President and Cabinet “where a President is disabled but 
is unwilling or actually unable to make a determination.”); 111 CONG. REC. 3254 (1965) (statement 
of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that Section 4 “provides for the eventuality that the President is unable 
to make a declaration of his own inability, or for other reasons does not declare his own inability.”); 
id. at 3262 (statement of Sen. Hiram Fong) (explaining that Vice President and Cabinet could 
declare President disabled under Section 4 if he did not declare his inability under Section 3). 
 183 111 CONG. REC. 7938 (1965) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler) (stating that Section 4 applied to 
“a situation where the President is unwilling or unable to declare his inability.”); id. at 7947 
(statement of Rep. Robert McClory) (referring to situation where disabled President “is unwilling 
or unable to relieve himself of the powers and duties” of the presidency); id. at 7955 (statement of 
Rep. Dante Fascell) (stating that Section 4 would apply if “the President were unable to determine 
his own inability, or if there were doubt or controversy about it . . . .”). 
 184 S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 6–7 (1965); H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 6–7 (1965); S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 4–
6 (1964); see also Birch Bayh, The Twenty-fifth Amendment: Dealing with Presidential Disability, 30 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 437, 441, 450 (1995) (stating that Amendment was intended to deal with “historic 
incidents” of presidential inability); SUNSTEIN, supra note 180, at 142–43 (recognizing significance 
of Garfield, Wilson, and Eisenhower disabilities as well as hypothetical in which Kennedy was 
disabled rather than killed). 
 185 111 CONG. REC. 7947 (1965) (statement of Rep. John V. Lindsay) (referring to Garfield and Wilson 
disabilities); id. at 7949 (statement of Rep. Jeffrey Cohelan) (referring to Garfield, Wilson and 
Eisenhower disabilities); id. at 7953 (statement of Rep. Charles E. Bennett) (referring to all three); id. 
at 7955 (statement of Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr.) (“[W]e have had Presidents disabled for long 
periods by assassins’ bullets or illness.”); id. at 3265 (statement of Sen. Frank Carlson) (referring to 
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but unwilling, to declare his inability for much of the relevant period.186  For 
instance, Wilson was conscious and competent to declare his inability for 
much of its duration yet unwilling to do so.187 
During the 1965 Senate hearings, Bayh stated that his proposal was 
designed to address “any type of inability” including international travel, 
communications breakdown, capture, “or anything that is imaginable.  The 
inability to perform the powers and duties of the office, for any reason is 
inability under the terms that we are discussing.”188  Although the terms were 
intended to have broad scope, Bayh said during the 1965 House hearings 
that he did not anticipate the use of Section 4 by the Vice President and 
Cabinet unless the President was “in pretty bad shape” and his condition was 
“rather obvious.”189 
When the Senate considered S.J. Res. 1 on February 19, 1965, Bayh 
initially articulated his usual broad formulation that Section 4 applied when 
the President was “unable” to declare his inability or “for other reasons does 
not declare his own inability.”190  Later that day he gave a narrower 
definition of “inability” and “unable” than he had during the 1965 Senate 
hearings.  In particular, following discussion with Senator Robert F. 
Kennedy, Bayh said those words in Section 4 mean “an impairment of the 
President’s faculties” such that “he is unable either to make or communicate 
his decisions as to his own competency to execute the powers and duties of 
his office.”  Bayh stated he intended that statement to clarify the statement 
given during the Senate hearings.191 
Had the discussion ended there, Bayh’s statement would have suggested 
a narrower definition since, taken literally, his formulation would seem to limit 
“unable” and “inability” to the President’s ability to “make or communicate” 
his decisions regarding his competency, and not to encompass situations in 
which the President was simply unwilling to accept a judgment of his 
 
Garfield, Wilson, and Eisenhower disabilities). 
 186 See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 79, at 123–28, 136–38 (describing Garfield’s condition during 80 days 
following shooting); Joel K. Goldstein, Vice-Presidential Behavior in a Disability Crisis: The Case of Thomas 
R. Marshall, 33 POL. & LIFE SCI. 37, 41–45 (Fall 2014) (describing Wilson’s inability but 
unwillingness to declare disability). 
 187 Goldstein, supra note 186, at 41–45; see JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., WOODROW WILSON: A 
BIOGRAPHY 535–78 (2009)  (describing Wilson’s activities during the period following his stroke). 
 188 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 76, at 20; see also id. at 9 (statement of Acting Att’y Gen. Nicholas 
Katzenbach) (stating that Section 4 and 5 of S.J. Res. 1 applied to the “extraordinary situations—
where the President cannot or does not declare his own inability . . . . ”). 
 189 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 82. 
 190 111 CONG. REC. 3254 (1965);  see also id. at 3262 (statement of Sen. Hiram Fong) (stating that 
Section 4 applies if President does not declare his own inability). 
 191 Id. at 3282. 
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incapacity even though apparent to others.  The discussion did not end there, 
however, and its continuation clarified and expanded Bayh’s explanation of 
the phrases.  Later in the same debate, Bayh stated that “[w]e are talking 
about a President who is unable to perform the powers and duties of his 
office,”192 thereby reaffirming that the touchstone remained the President’s 
ability “to perform the powers and duties of his office,” not simply his ability 
to make and communicate decisions regarding his competency.   
The terms were further clarified when the Senate considered the 
conference report on June 30, 1965.  In a colloquy with Senator Robert F. 
Kennedy, Bayh resisted the suggestion that the proposed amendment 
addressed “total inability” since he said that a President “might be physically 
able” but “might not possess the mental capacity to make a decision and 
perform the powers and duties of his office.  We are talking about inability 
to perform the constitutional duties of the office of President.”193  When 
Kennedy again suggested that what was meant was “total inability to 
perform the powers and duties of office,” Bayh agreed but promptly qualified 
his answer by repeating that inability did not involve a President who made 
an “unpopular decision.”194  Bayh’s qualification suggested that he was 
excluding a relatively narrow set of circumstances.  Bayh later referred to an 
inability “that would seriously impair the President’s ability to perform the 
powers and duties of his office,”195 a reference that further rejected the “total 
inability” limitation for a “seriously impair” formulation.  Bayh resisted the 
idea that inability was limited to “mental disability” since a President might, 
for instance, be unable to perform because he had been captured by an 
enemy.196  When Kennedy said inability “involves physical or mental 
inability to make or communicate his decision regarding his capacity and 
physical or mental inability to exercise the powers and duties of his office” 
Bayh agreed and he and Kennedy described this statement as Bayh’s 
February 19, 1965, definition.197   
 
 192 Id. at 3282–83 (statements of Sen. Philip Hart and Sen. Birch Bayh). 
 193 111 CONG. REC. 15,381(1965); see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 45–46 (statement of 
Sen. Birch Bayh) (imagining a situation where Vice President and Cabinet majority might tell a 
President who could “walk and talk” that “the best interest of the country” called for the Vice 
President to continue to act as President since the President was “not recovered.”); 111 CONG. REC. 
3254–55 (1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (discussing the possibility that a President who can 
“walk and talk” is not “sufficiently recovered” and the “best interests” of the nation mandate the 
Vice President’s continued action). 
 194 111 CONG. REC. 15,381(1965). 
 195 Id.  
 196 Id.  
 197 Id.  
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But Kennedy’s June 30, 1965, formulation which Bayh embraced was 
much broader than Bayh’s February 1965 statement.  The June 30 statement 
specifically included inability to exercise presidential powers and duties as 
well as to make or communicate a decision regarding the same.  Bayh’s 
reference to “seriously impair the President’s ability to perform the powers 
and duties of his office” reinforced the broader definition and implicitly 
rejected the idea that a “total” inability was required.  Indeed, Kennedy 
understood that the terms went beyond the February 1965 statement because 
he opened his discussion on June 30, 1965, by describing Section 4 as the 
provision that allowed others to decide that the President was disabled when 
he was “unwilling to make the declaration of inability himself.”198   
During the House’s deliberations on April 13, 1965, key representatives 
interpreted the terms broadly.  Celler said Section 4 addressed the situation 
where the President was “unwilling or unable to declare his inability.”199  
McCulloch described Section 4 as applying if “[the President] should fail to 
[declare his inability] or in the case where he is too ill to do so[.]”200  Poff 
defined the cases falling within Section 4 in way that was generally consistent 
with Bayh’s June 30, 1965, formulation.  He described them as those “in 
which the President, by reason of physical or mental debility, is unable to 
perform his duties but is unable or unwilling to make a rational decision to 
relinquish the powers of his office, even for a temporary period.”201  He 
offered “two illustrative examples” of the cases within Section 4 as ones 
where the President “by reason of some physical ailment or some sudden 
accident is unconscious or paralyzed and therefore unable to make or to 
communicate the decision to relinquish” presidential powers or when “the 
President, by reason of mental debility, is unable or unwilling to make any 
rational decision, including particularly the decision to stand aside.”202  Poff’s 
definition, like the Bayh June 30, 1965, formulation, clearly applied to 
physical or mental disability to perform as well as to make or communicate 
a decision regarding inability.  Two articles Feerick wrote, which were 
published shortly after Congress proposed the Amendment and were widely-
circulated during the period in which states considered ratification, made 
clear that Section 4 applied in situations where the President either could not 
 
 198 Id. at 15,380. 
 199 Id. at 7938. 
 200 Id. at 7942. 
 201 Id. at 7941. 
 202 Id.; see also Richard H. Poff, Presidential Inability and the Twenty-fifth Amendment, 11 STUDENT L.J. 15, 
16–17 (Dec. 1965) (discussing two categories to which Section 4 applies). 
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or would not declare his disability.203 
As previously noted, the Garfield and Wilson inabilities helped inspire 
the Amendment’s presidential inability provisions.  A decade after Congress 
proposed the Amendment to the states, Bayh said Section 4 was supposed to 
address “a Woodrow Wilson situation, where the President may be at least 
partially impaired but doesn’t realize it.”204  More generally, framers of the 
Amendment, like Bayh205 and Feerick206 have continued to make clear that 
Section 4 was to apply when a President is unwilling to recognize a mental 
or physical disability. 
The very structure of Section 4 further rebuts the suggestion that it is 
limited to situations when the President cannot make or communicate a 
decision regarding his inability.  As will be discussed below, Section 4 
includes procedures whereby after a President is declared disabled, the Vice 
President and a majority of the Cabinet can contest the President’s 
declaration that he is able to resume discharging presidential powers and 
duties, subject to review by the houses of Congress.  The procedures 
contemplate that, even though the President has declared himself fit to 
handle his responsibilities, he may be precluded from doing so in some cases 
for almost a month while first the executive branch and then Congress decide 
whether he is in fact able to resume.  And if the constitutional decision-
 
 203 See Feerick, supra note 124, at 199–200 (stating that Section 4 “covers the most difficult case, that 
is, where the President cannot or refuses to declare his own inability.”); John D. Feerick, Proposed 
Amendment on Presidential Inability and Vice-Presidential Vacancy, 51 A.B.A. J. 915, 916 (1965) (stating that 
Section 4 was “intended to cover situations in which the President is unable to declare his own 
inability or in which he refuses to do so when disabled.”); see also American Bar Association & John 
D. Feerick, Presidential Inability and Vice Presidential Vacancy: With Questions and Answers (1965) (stating 
that the President can be declared disabled if he “is unable to so declare . . . or if he refuses to 
declare his inability, as in case of mental infirmity.”). 
 204 Examination, supra note 125, at 58. 
 205 Birch Bayh, Reflections on the Twenty-fifth Amendment as We Enter a New Century, in MANAGING CRISIS: 
PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 55, 58 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 
2000) (stating that Section 4 “provides for those occasions when the president is unable or unwilling 
to act voluntarily.”); Bayh, supra note 184, at 441 (“Section 4, clause 1 provides for those instances 
when the President is unable or unwilling to act of his own volition.”). 
 206 See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 10, at 115 (stating that Section 4 covers situations when President 
“cannot or does not” declare himself disabled); Feerick, supra note 5, at 925 (“This section covers 
the most difficult cases of inability—when the President cannot or refuses to declare his own 
inability.”); see also Operation of the Twenty-fifth Amendment Respecting Presidential Succession, supra note 180,  
at 66 (stating that Section 4 applies when President is unable or unwilling to declare his inability); 
ROSE MCDERMOTT, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, ILLNESS, AND DECISION MAKING 205 (2008) 
(stating that Section 4 applies to a President who is unwilling or unable to declare inability); Robert 
E. Gilbert, The Genius of the Twenty-fifth Amendment: Guarding Against Presidential Disability but Safeguarding 
the Presidency, in MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH 
AMENDMENT 25, 33 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000) (stating that Section 4 applies when a disabled 
President is unable or unwilling to  transfer presidential powers).   
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makers conclude that the conscious President is disabled, notwithstanding his 
insistence to the contrary, he can be precluded from exercising presidential 
powers and duties for a longer period, until at least one of the decision-
makers changes its mind.  That period could, theoretically, last for the rest of 
the presidential term.  The inclusion of that mechanism makes clear that the 
Amendment envisions that a President could be conscious and able to 
communicate his decision—that he was fit to handle the responsibilities of 
his office—and yet be prevented from doing so because he is disabled.   
Of course, those specific checks apply when the President has been 
previously determined through the Section 4 procedure to be unable to 
discharge the presidency, not before the initial determination.  Yet that 
distinction is irrelevant to this discussion which focuses on the meaning of the 
Section 4 language.  It would be ludicrous for the Amendment to  preclude 
a previously declared disabled President from resuming the exercise of 
presidential powers and duties, notwithstanding his vigorous insistence on his 
fitness, but  prevent the initial transfer of those same powers and duties from 
a disabled President simply because he was conscious and able to 
communicate.  Such a bizarre statement should be rejected absent 
constitutional language compelling it. 
This discussion provides some basis to address some of the claims 
regarding the alleged ambiguity or scope of the standard.  The lack of 
definition represented a deliberate effort to preserve flexibility.  Consistent 
with its text, Section 4 is available to address a wide range of mental and 
physical ailments and logistical impediments that could incapacitate a 
President.  Bayh’s definition on February 19, 1965, is the sole support in the 
legislative record for the proposition that Section 4 was “designed” for a 
situation where the President could not communicate his inability.  But that 
single utterance was narrower than his many prior and subsequent 
statements, including those during the extensive discussion on June 30, 1965, 
of Section 4 immediately prior to the Senate’s final action on the Amendment 
a week later.  Its distinct outlier status, and the fact that Bayh returned to a 
much broader formulation during the Senate’s later deliberation, counsels 
against giving the February 19, 1965, interpretation weight.207  Similarly, the 
House leaders most responsible for H.R.J. Res. 1, Celler, McCulloch and 
Poff, all articulated the broader standard as discussed above, including when 
the House gave its most extended floor consideration of the measure some 
two months after the Senate’s February discussion.  Moreover, the text and  
structure of the Amendment makes clear its wider application.   
 
 207 But see Gustafson, supra note 166, at 482–83 (relying on February 19, 1965, statement and 
minimizing importance of far broader Bayh statement on June 30, 1965).  
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A presidential inability under Section 4 should be one, as Bayh said, that 
“seriously” impairs the President and the evidence should be clear, but the 
President need not be “absolutely and unambiguously incapable—like John 
F. Kennedy was, in the hours between when he was shot and when he died” 
as Zimmerman contended.208  The period between Kennedy’s shooting and 
death did not last “hours”209 but, in any event, that example presented the 
extreme case.  The framers of the Amendment thought that Garfield, Wilson, 
and Eisenhower were disabled and were appropriate candidates for Section 
4 treatment had it existed during their terms yet none approached Kennedy’s 
condition during the moments between the shooting and his death.  During 
most of the period following his September 1919 stroke through the last 
seventeen months of his presidency, Wilson made some decisions and even 
held Cabinet meetings beginning in spring 1920, yet legislative materials 
surrounding the creation and proposal of the Amendment were predicated 
on the conclusion that he was disabled at least during much of that time.  The 
fact that a President could sign a paper (as did Garfield and Wilson),210 meet 
with some congressmen and the Cabinet (Wilson),211 or fire a secretary of 
state (Wilson)212 or wave from the window did not render him able to 
discharge presidential powers and duties if he or she otherwise was not up to 
those demands.  
The framers also assumed that presidential inability determinations 
would be based on facts regarding the President’s physical or mental 
condition and the needs of the country.  When the inability involved a 
medical condition, the Amendment presumed that the Vice President and 
Cabinet would act based upon “adequate consultation with medical experts 
who were intricately familiar with the President’s physical and mental 
condition.”213  Numerous comments during hearings and floor debates 
echoed the assumption that decision-makers at all stages would consult with 
appropriate medical authorities.   
 
 208 Zimmerman, supra note 167. 
 209 LARRY J. SABATO, THE KENNEDY HALF CENTURY: THE PRESIDENCY, ASSASSINATION, AND 
LASTING LEGACY OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 209 (2013). 
 210 FEERICK, supra note 79, at 126 (regarding Garfield); id. at 173 (regarding Wilson). 
 211 Id. at 179–80. 
 212 Id. at 176–78. 
 213 S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965); see also H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 13 (1965) (same); S. REP. NO. 88-
1382, at 12 (1964) (same); 111 CONG. REC. 7939 (1965) (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff) (stating 
expectation that decision-makers would consult with medical experts); id. (statement of Rep. Clark 
MacGregor) (stating expectation that Vice President and Cabinet would consult with “the very 
finest medical brains . . . available”); Bayh, supra note 184, at 444 (calling for reliance on medical 
advice if disability involves physical or mental illness). 
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They also thought that the Vice President and Cabinet would have 
relevant information that would contribute to a decision in many 
circumstances.  They would be “most familiar with [the president’s] 
condition.”214  They would also be familiar with domestic and international 
events to gauge the potential need for presidential action.215  In other words, 
the observations of presidential behavior of informed laypeople were also 
deemed relevant. 
The record also suggests that presidential inability may be circumstantial.  
Section 4 might apply to a short inability if a President were briefly 
unconscious when missiles were deployed.216  In essence, whether a President 
was “unable to perform the powers and duties” of the presidency was a 
contextual question that had to weigh the President’s condition and situation 
and the domestic and international stage.  It often could not be determined 
based on predetermined specific formulas and Section 4 certainly was 
designed to be applied in some situations when a President was conscious 
and able to communicate yet not able to discharge the powers and duties of 
the presidency. 
Those who have construed Section 4 narrowly overlook the fact that 
much of the limitation it provided came from procedural, not definitional, 
constraints.  Unless Congress replaced the Cabinet, the initial decision-
makers were presumed presidential loyalists who owed their positions to the 
chief executive.  By the mid-1960s, the practice of Presidents choosing their 
running mates was entrenched217 and the framers of the Amendment saw the 
Vice President as a close personal and political ally of the President.218  
Although they overstated the case at the time, subsequent history has 
developed consistent with their vision.219  Historically Vice Presidents had 
been reluctant to act,220 a lesson which somewhat calmed anxiety over the 
 
 214 H. R. Rep. No. 89-203, at 13 (1965); S. Rep. No. 89-66, at 13 (1965); S. Rep. No. 88-1382, at 11–
12 (1964). 
 215 See, e.g., H. R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 13 (1965) (stating that the Vice President and the Cabinet would 
be “the most feasible formula” to make decisions about the President’s condition because of their 
familiarity with the President’s condition); S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965) (same); S. REP. NO. 88-
1382, at 11–12 (1964) (same); 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff) 
(discussing knowledge of the Vice President and Cabinet regarding the President and his health); 
FEERICK, supra note 10, at 59 (summarizing advantages of including Cabinet in decision-making). 
 216 111 CONG. REC. 15,381(1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (explaining that Section 4 might 
apply to a short inability if the President were unconscious during a missile attack on the country). 
 217 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 24. 
 218 Goldstein, supra note 4, at 530–36. 
 219 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 27, 29–35, 293, 301. 
 220 See S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 6 (1965) (referring to two occasions when the Vice President failed to 
assume the duties of the President when the President was disabled); Poff, supra note 202, at 17 
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prospect of usurpation of power.  The Cabinet was seen as a group that was 
also loyal to, and in regular contact with, the President.221  Accordingly, the 
framers of the Amendment thought that the triggering procedures in Section 
4 would protect the President from improper treatment.  The requirement 
that the Vice President receive a two-thirds vote in both houses to sustain his 
position against a presidential “no disability” declaration provided further 
assurance that Section 4 would not be lightly used.  Right after explaining 
the decision not to define the terms, Poff underscored the reliance on a 
procedural approach when he said “[i]t is highly unlikely that the responsible 
Government officials entrusted with this great power would abuse it by 
declaring a President elected by the people of this country disabled when in 
fact he was not, especially when the Congress is given the ultimate voice in 
this determination.”222 
Poff’s statement discloses a premise inherent in the thinking of the 
framers of the Amendment.  They expected the decision-makers in the 
executive and legislative branches to act as patriots, not partisans.  The 
legislative record included many references to this expectation that 
responsible officials would rise to the occasion and discharge their duty.223  
The common suppositions in recent discussions that co-partisans would not 
act against a President of their party may be accurate but, if they are, they 
reflect a more cynical view of human nature than that of the architects of the 
Twenty-fifth Amendment. 
As a practical matter, decision-makers will probably hesitate to declare a 
President disabled when he could have, but did not, invoke Section 3.224  And 
declaring a conscious President disabled certainly presents challenges not 
 
(noting that Vice Presidents had historically been reluctant to act); Goldstein, supra note 4, at 541 
(discussing historic reluctance of Vice Presidents to act to address presidential inability and response 
of Twenty-fifth Amendment). 
 221 See, e.g., Poff, supra note 202, at 17. 
 222 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff). 
 223 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965) (presuming that “we shall always be dealing with ‘reasonable 
men’ at the highest governmental level.”); H. R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 13 (1965) (same); S. REP. NO. 
88-1382, at 11 (1964) (same); see also 111 CONG. REC. 15,591–92 (1965) (statement of Sen. Everett 
Dirksen) (expressing faith that executive officials would declare President disabled in appropriate 
case); id. at 15,592 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that American people would not tolerate 
behavior by Vice President that was not in national interest); id. at 3254 (statement of Sen. Birch 
Bayh) (stating the Vice President has “constitutional obligation” to act when President is disabled 
and the nation’s welfare demands it); Feerick, supra note 124, at 202 (arguing that history suggests 
the Cabinet would recognize presidential inability where appropriate). 
 224 Joel K. Goldstein, The Vice-Presidency and the Twenty-fifth Amendment: The Power of Reciprocal Relationships, 
in MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 165, 
196–98 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000). 
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present when the President is unconscious.  The factual evidence is likely to 
be less clear when the President is conscious, the political costs may be 
increased, and greater discretion is required since the President may retaliate 
if he learns of Section 4 deliberations before action is taken.225  Yet, these 
enhanced challenges should not lead to the conclusion that Section 4 was 
designed exclusively for an unconscious President.  It was not.  If Section 4 
was only intended for such limited circumstances, the record would not 
contain so many references to medical consultations, psychiatrists, or the 
possibility of examining the President, in addition to the other discussions 
recounted above which make clear that Section 4 applied to a President who 
was unwilling to declare his inability as well as one who was unable to do so.  
The materials presented above make clear that Section 4 applies more 
broadly to serious impairments that disable a President, including those the 
President should, but is unwilling to, acknowledge. 
It is also unlikely that the Vice President and Cabinet would base a 
disability determination on a condition fully known to voters at the prior 
election absent some worsening.  The framers of the Amendment may have 
expected some deterioration in the President’s condition as the normal 
predicate for a Section 4 decision,226 yet the text of Section 4 does not 
preclude its use in such circumstances.227  It applies “Whenever” the Vice 
President and Cabinet transmit the requisite communication based on a 
determination that the President is unable to discharge his powers and duties.  
Indeed, Section 4 is predicated on the belief that the Vice President and 
Cabinet, from working closely with the President, and in consultation with 
his doctors, might detect presidential incapacity that would not be visible to 
those lacking such unique access.   
Hypotheticals based on historic events help illustrate circumstances when 
a Vice President and Cabinet might find a President disabled although the 
electorate had knowledge regarding a prior affliction.  Eisenhower was re-
elected in 1956 following his September 1955 heart attack that largely 
sidelined him for about four months,228 as well as his June 1956 emergency 
 
 225 Id. 
 226 See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 15,593 (1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that Section 4 would 
address the situation where  the President, “although physically able, is not the man, from a 
substantive point, who was previously elected to that office.”). 
 227 Cf. YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, supra note 8, at 22 (“A President who cannot 
demonstrate the minimal competence to rationally perform the duties of the office might be deemed 
constitutionally unable, even if signs of that deficiency were clear at the time of the President’s 
selection to the term in which he sits.”). 
 228 IRWIN GELLMAN, THE PRESIDENT AND THE APPRENTICE: EISENHOWER AND NIXON, 1952–
1961 272 (2015). 
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ileitis surgery.  Unbeknownst to the public, two of Eisenhower’s three doctors 
(and both of his cardiologists) had urged him not to seek re-election due to 
health concerns.229  During the campaign, Eisenhower’s opponents publicly 
predicted that Eisenhower was unlikely to survive a second term and his re-
election would result in Nixon succeeding to the presidency.230  In fact, 
Eisenhower completed his term, although he did experience a stroke that 
affected his speech and forced him to miss some commitments, as well as 
some other heart ailments during his second term that were largely 
unreported until after his presidency ended.231 
Yet imagine that Section 4 existed during Eisenhower’s second term and 
that Nixon and the Cabinet had determined that Eisenhower’s heart 
ailments rendered him unable to perform his duties.  The fact that the public 
knew of his heart attack, yet re-elected him in 1956, presumably should not 
have precluded the invocation of Section 4 if otherwise appropriate.  
Section 4 was not, however, intended as a mechanism to express no 
confidence in a President who makes unpopular decisions or who is deemed 
to lack sufficient talent.  When Senator Philip Hart asked, “Is it clear that this 
means far more than disagreement with respect to a judgment he may make, 
a decision he may make with respect to incapacity and inability, or must it 
be based upon a judgment that is very far reaching?”  Bayh replied “that we 
are not dealing with an unpopular decision that must be made in time of trial 
and which might render the President unpopular.  We are talking about a 
President who is unable to perform the powers and duties of his office.”232  
Bayh’s response made clear that Section 4 was not a “no confidence” vehicle 
against a President whose popularity had plummeted.  Feerick concluded 
that the legislative record “made clear that unpopularity, incompetence, 
impeachable conduct, poor judgment, and laziness do not constitute an 
‘inability’ within the meaning of the Amendment.”233  The apparent framers’ 
intent would tend to cut against  the sorts of extensions of Section 4 that 
Posner, Dallek, Graber, and others have suggested unless these qualities or 
misconduct were associated with a physical or mental disability. 
 
 229 ROBERT E. GILBERT, THE MORTAL PRESIDENCY: ILLNESS AND ANGUISH IN THE WHITE HOUSE 
97 (1998). 
 230 Id. at 105. 
 231 Id. at 106–16. 
 232 111 CONG. REC. 3282–83 (1965) (statements of Sen. Philip Hart and Sen. Birch Bayh); see also id. 
at 15,381 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating Section 4 did not apply to President who made an 
unpopular decision).  
 233 FEERICK, supra note 10, at 117; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 180, at 144, 148 (noting the same). 
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D.  Who Decides? 
Some writers have misstated the group Section 4 empowers to act with the 
Vice President absent congressional action.  Historian Joshua Zeitz wrote that 
Section 4 was “ambiguous” on several points including who were the 
“principal officers of the executive departments” who are empowered to act 
with the Vice President.  Zeitz said that phrase could mean Cabinet members, 
although he pointed out that some officials have Cabinet status without serving 
as department heads.  He  predicted that litigation would be inevitable.234  
Professor David Pozen of Columbia Law School criticized the Amendment for 
failing to define “principal heads of the executive departments” and suggested 
controversy on the subject among its proponents.235 
In fact, the group that acts with the Vice President is  authoritatively 
defined in the legislative history and the Supreme Court has so recognized.  
A brief summary of this issue that received considerable attention236 reveals 
the clarity with which Section 4 resolved this issue generally. 
The proposed Amendment, as introduced in the Senate and House in 
1965, provided in Section 4 that “the Vice President with the written 
concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or such 
other body as Congress may by law provide” could declare the President 
disabled if he did not invoke Section 3.237  The Senate Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendments modified the language in S.J. Res. 1 on February 
4, 1965, to replace “heads of the executive departments” with “principal 
officers of the executive departments.”238  Under questioning by several 
members of the judiciary committee of the House of Representatives,239 Bayh 
 
 234 Zeitz, supra note 165; see also  Z. Byron Wolff, Using the 25th Amendment to Depose Trump Would Require a 
Cabinet Mutiny, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/12/politics/25th-amendment-donald-trump-
steve-bannon-mike-pence/index.html (last updated Oct. 30, 2017, 2:38 PM) (implying incorrectly that 
the White House Chief of Staff, U.S. Trade Representative, Director of National Intelligence, United 
Nations representative, Director of OMB, CIA, Administrator of EPA, and Small Business 
Administration are among the Section 4 decision-makers). 
 235 David Pozen, The Deceptively Clear Twenty-fifth Amendment, CONST. CTR. (July 11, 2018), 
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-xxv/the-
deceptively-clear-twenty-fifth-amendment-by-david-pozen/interp/42 (questioning what are the 
“executive departments” and who are the “principal officers” of these departments). 
 236 FEERICK, supra note 10, at 117 (“Few subjects received as much attention as that of the composition 
of the Cabinet.”). 
 237 S.J. Res. 1, 89th Cong. (1965); H.R.J. Res. 1, 89th Cong. (1965). 
 238 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 42–43. 
 239 Id. at 52–53 (questions by Rep. Basil L. Whitener); id. at 55–56 (questions by Rep. Byron G. Rogers); 
id. at 58–59 (questions by Rep. Basil L. Whitener); id. at 59–60 (questions by Rep. Arch A. Moore, 
Jr.); id. at 60–61 (questions by Rep. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.); id. at 61 (questions by Rep. William 
M. McCulloch). 
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had testified on February 9, 1965, that the new formulation did not include 
the heads of the army, navy and air force, or of the atomic energy commission, 
the ambassador to the United Nations, or director of the poverty program,240 
but rather referred to the Cabinet.241  Chairman Celler suggested that the 
issue should be clarified and that Attorney General Katzenbach might 
enlighten the legislators when he appeared.242  When Katzenbach followed 
Bayh to the stand, he advised that the term could be authoritatively defined 
in the committee report.243  The Senate report the following day stated the 
conclusion of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary that the new 
formulation “more adequately conveys the intended meaning of [S]ections 4 
and 5, that only those members of the President’s official Cabinet were to 
participate in any decision of disability referred to under these [S]ections” and 
noted that the language was taken from the Opinions Clause in Article II.244  
The following month, the House Judiciary Committee included in the report 
accompanying H.R.J. Res. 1 the statement that the term “principal officers of 
the executive departments” was limited to “the Presidential appointees who 
direct the 10 executive departments named in 5 U.S.C. 1, or any executive 
department established in the future, generally considered to comprise the 
President’s Cabinet . . . .”245  Representative Celler, the chair of the House 
Judiciary Committee and an author of the ultimate amendment, specifically 
referenced that statement from the legislative report in the April 13, 1965, 
House debate in response to a question,246 and McCulloch247 and Poff,248 the 
two principal Republican sponsors of H.R.J. Res. 1 as amended,249 echoed 
that interpretation.  In the Senate, Senator Philip Hart specifically asked 
whether “the heads of the executive departments” referred to those identified 
in 5 U.S.C. 1 and 2; Bayh agreed that it did.250  In other words, the principal 
 
 240 Id. at 52, 59–61 (statements of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
 241 Id. at 45, 52. 
 242 Id. at 61–62 (statements of Rep. Emanuel Celler). 
 243 Id. at 103 (statements of Att’y Gen. Nicholas Katzenbach). 
 244 S. REP. NO. 89–66, at 2 (1965). 
 245 H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 3 (1965). 
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proponents in each house articulated the same definition during floor debate 
preceding votes. 
The Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice reached the 
same conclusion when it studied the issue in 1985.251  At that point, the 
pertinent code provision listed 13 such officials, beginning with the secretary 
of state and extending through the secretary of education.252 
The Supreme Court has specifically recognized that “executive 
department” as used in Section 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment means 
“Cabinet-level entities.”253  It noted “the fact that the Amendment strictly 
limits the term ‘department’ to those departments named in 5 U.S.C. § 
101 . . . .”254  Justice Scalia (and the three justices who joined his dissent) 
agreed that, as used in Section 4, “the phrase ‘the principal officers of the 
executive departments’ is limited to members of the Cabinet” although 
different reasoning brought him to that conclusion.255 
Unless Congress creates some “other body” to act with the Vice 
President,256 thereby supplanting the Cabinet,257 Section 4 refers to the 
“principal officers” of the (now) 15 executive departments beginning with the 
 
only); id. at 55–56 (statement of Rep. Byron G. Rogers and Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that Section 
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circulated during the ratification period, confirm this meaning.  Feerick, supra note 124, at 200 & 
n.144 (confirming that Section 4 language refers to specified officers who serve in Cabinet); Feerick, 
supra note 203, at 916 & n.7 (confirming that Section 4 language refers to specified officers who 
serve in Cabinet). 
 251 Operation of the Twenty-fifth Amendment Respecting Presidential Succession, supra note 180, at 69 (explaining 
that the heads of departments listed in 5 U.S.C. § 101 are the “principal officers of the executive 
departments” for the purposes of the Twenty-fifth Amendment). 
 252 Id.  
 253 See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 887 (1991) (stating that “it is instructive that the hearings on 
the Twenty-fifth Amendment confirm that the term ‘department’ refers to Cabinet-level 
entities . . . .”). 
 254 Id. at 887 n.4. 
 255 See id. at 917 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (accepting that “the 
phrase ‘principal officers of the of the executive departments’ is limited to members of the Cabinet” 
because of the structural composition of the phrase). 
 256 The text and legislative record make clear that the Vice President is an indispensable party to a 
Section 4 presidential inability determination.  See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 10, at 121 (stating that 
Congress cannot remove the Vice President from the process); Goldstein, supra note 4, at 527 
(describing the Vice President as the “indispensable participant” in Section 4 determinations). 
 257 The legislative record makes clear that if Congress creates “such other body” it supplants the 
Cabinet; the Vice President does not have the luxury of shopping between them for a party.  See, 
e.g., FEERICK, supra note 10, at 121 (stating that the legislative history “clearly shows” that if 
Congress creates an “other body” that body “replaces the Cabinet” as the body that acts with the 
Vice President). 
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department of state and extending to the department of homeland 
security.258  There is some uncertainty regarding whether an under secretary 
can act if the top job is vacant since different views were expressed259 or 
whether a recess appointee could serve.260  There is none, however, 
regarding who are the “principal heads of the executive departments.” 
E.  The Consequence of Section 4 
Some scholars and other commentators have erroneously described 
Section 4 as a means to permanently remove a President.  Josh Gerstein of 
Politico referred to the Twenty-fifth Amendment as a “provision to remove a 
president from office.”261  Law professor Mark Graber wrote that Trump 
“plainly meets the standards for removal from office under the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.”262  Ian Tuttle of the National Review spoke of Section 4 as a 
means to remove Trump from office.263  Professor Turley characterized 
Section 4 as providing for “permanent . . .  removal from power”264 and as a 
means to “end . . . the Trump administration.”265  John Hudak of the 
Brookings Institution properly distinguished between removing the 
President’s powers and removing him from office but mischaracterized the 
two-thirds vote of the House and Senate as one “to permanently strip the 
powers of the presidency away from the president and transfer them to the 
vice president.”266  Later, he repeated the claim that a two-thirds vote of each 
 
 258 5 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 259 Compare H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 3 (1965) (expressing view that under secretaries could participate) 
with 111 CONG. REC. 3284 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (stating his opinion that they could not).  
Feerick summarizes the arguments and states persuasively that the House Judiciary Committee’s 
view is preferable.  It also appears to have been the predominant view of those who expressed an 
opinion.  FEERICK, supra note 10, at 117–18; see also Operation of the Twenty-fifth Amendment Respecting 
Presidential Succession, supra note 180, at 69 (stating that under secretary, principal deputy, or recess 
appointee “might” be able to act in absence of department head). 
 260 Operation of the Twenty-fifth Amendment Respecting Presidential Succession, supra note 180, at 69 (stating that 
recess appointee “might” be able to act in absence of department head). 
 261 Josh Gerstein, 25th Amendment Unlikely to Be Invoked over Trump’s Mental Health, POLITICO (Jan. 7, 
2018, 8:08 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/07/trump-25th-amendment-mental-
health-327503; see id. (referring to “amendment’s language on what could lead a president to be 
involuntarily removed from office . . . . ”). 
 262 Graber, supra note 56. 
 263 Tuttle, supra note 34. 
 264 Turley, supra note 47. 
 265 Turley, supra note 48; see also Shear, supra note 62 (incorrectly stating that if two-thirds in each house 
voted that  Trump was disabled Trump would be “stripped permanently” of the presidency and 
Pence would “become president.”). 
 266 John Hudak, The 25th Amendment, BROOKINGS: UNPACKED (June 9, 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/unpacked/2017/06/09/the-25th-amendment/; see also Hudak, 
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house would effect “permanent removal” of presidential powers from the 
President.267   
Two points merit noting.  First, on their face, the inability provisions of 
the Amendment do not remove the President from office.  They simply 
transfer presidential powers and duties to the Vice President while the 
President retains his office.  They separate presidential powers and duties 
from the President, but the President remains President and may reclaim the 
powers and duties of the office under Sections 3 and 4.268  Indeed, the 
concept that a disabled President should simply lose presidential powers and 
duties, not the presidency, was a central premise of the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment.  Historically, handling presidential inability had been 
complicated by the fear that if the Vice President exercised presidential 
powers and duties he would become President, thereby displacing the 
incumbent.269  The concern related to the fact that the original vice-
presidential succession clause was textually ambiguous.  It provided that 
upon the President’s removal, death, resignation “or Inability to discharge 
the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice 
President.”270  The clause was unclear whether “the Same” which devolved 
on the Vice President was the presidency or simply the “Powers and Duties” 
of the presidency.  Notwithstanding this ambiguity, the text mandated that 
the same thing devolved in all four contingencies.  Practice had led to the 
belief that upon a presidential death, the Vice President became President 
 
supra note 62 (stating that vote of two-thirds of each house of Congress “permanently” makes Vice 
President acting President); id. (referring to all Democrats voting “to remove the president from 
office permanently.”). 
 267 Hudak, supra note 266.  But see Jon Meacham, Could the 25th Amendment Be Trump’s Downfall? Here’s 
How It Works, TIME (Jan. 11, 2018), http://time.com/5098402/could-the-25th-amendment-be-
trumps-downfall/ (last updated Jan. 26, 2018, 12:37 PM) (noting correctly that the President could 
make repeated challenges to restore presidential powers to him); Andrew Prokop, The 25th 
Amendment, Explained: How a President can Be Declared Unfit to Serve, VOX, 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/2/9/14488980/25th-amendment-trump-pence 
(last updated Jan. 12, 2018, 10:32 AM) (explaining, in a different context, that the President only 
loses his powers, not his office). 
 268 See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 78 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that “we hope 
and pray to God that the disability will be removed.  With this amendment, the President can 
reassume his powers and duties, and if he is replaced by the Vice President, that the Vice President 
can resume the powers and duties of his own office.”). 
 269 See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 79, at 133–34, 237–38 (explaining concern before the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment that if a Vice President acted as President during a presidential inability the Vice 
President would supplant the President for the remainder of the presidential term ); RUTH C. 
SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 52, 55–57 (1951) (explaining that the Vice President was not 
called upon to act as President during the Garfield and Wilson disabilities due to fear  that such 
action would displace the incapacitated President). 
 270 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
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and since the Constitution treated death and disability symmetrically vis-à-
vis the Vice President, some argued that a presidential inability would lead 
to the displacement of the President by the Vice President.  That had 
inhibited Vice Presidents from acting when Presidents were disabled and had 
deterred presidential associates from encouraging them to do so.271  
The Twenty-fifth Amendment proceeded on the assumption that much of 
the problem regarding presidential inability could be solved by clarifying that 
the Vice President could simply act as, not become, President, and that she 
could do so for a time limited to the period during which the President was 
disabled.  Indeed, three of the four clauses of the Amendment reflected this 
idea.  Whereas the Vice President became President under Section 1 following 
a presidential death, resignation or removal, she simply acted as President 
while remaining Vice President during a presidential inability.  Under 
Section 3 or 4 the Vice President assumes presidential powers and duties, not 
the “office,” as “Acting President.”272  Section 3 and 4 emphasize that the 
President remains President by describing how he can resume presidential 
powers and duties and by referring to the presidency as “his” office even when 
the Vice President exercises its powers and duties.  Even if each house of 
Congress votes by the requisite two-thirds majority that “the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,” the “Vice President” 
continues to discharge those powers and duties (not the office) as “Acting 
President.”  The Vice President can never become President under Section 4.  
These textual clues lead to the second point.  Section 4 does not 
“permanently” remove presidential powers from the President.  Even if 
Congress supports the conclusion of the Vice President and Cabinet that the 
President is disabled, the President can make repeated declarations that “no 
inability exists” and can “resume the powers and duties of his office” either 
upon subsequent acquiescence by the Vice President and Cabinet or if less 
than two-thirds of either House vote her disabled within twenty-one days.273  
 
 271 See FEERICK, supra note 79, at 135–36 (explaining the decision of Garfield’s Cabinet not to ask Vice 
President Chester A. Arthur to act as President owing to concerns that such action might supplant 
Garfield); SILVA, supra note 269, at 52, 55–57 (discussing the Cabinet’s concerns of dispossessing 
Garfield of presidential authority); Goldstein, supra note 3, at 674–76 (“The uncertainty prevented 
the Cabinet from inviting Arthur to act as President although its members all though that 
desirable.”).  
 272 See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 65 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that under 
Sections 3 and 4, the Vice President does not “have the office of President but that of Acting 
President.”); id. at 65 (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff) (same); cf. 111 CONG. REC. 3252–53 
(1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that the Vice President only assumes powers and 
duties of the presidency, not the office itself pursuant to Section 3). 
 273 See FEERICK, supra note 10, at 120 (“Since an inability decision does not result in the President’s 
removal from office, there is nothing to prevent him, after an adverse congressional decision, from 
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Section 4 does not limit the President to only one “no inability” declaration.  
Although it does not explicitly authorize the President to repeat the process, 
it does not prohibit her from doing so and it strongly implies that she would 
be able to repeat the process.  Why else would the President remain 
“President?”  If the President only had one comeback chance, the 
Amendment would have displaced her from office after an adverse vote by 
the houses of Congress.  Since a premise of Section 4 is that the President 
should discharge presidential powers and duties unless there is reason to 
think she is unable to discharge them, she retains office with the prospect of 
recovering the powers and duties if her inability ends.   
The legislative history supports this conclusion.  Bayh stated that a 
President who Congress found to be disabled could raise the issue again 
although the “degree of frequency” of her appeals might affect Congress’s 
disposition.274  Katzenbach,275 Representative John Lindsay,276 and Brownell 
all opined that the President could raise multiple challenges.277 
A corollary of the foregoing is that neither Section 3 nor 4 trigger a vice-
presidential vacancy as some have incorrectly suggested.278  Even if the 
President’s inability becomes permanent, unless he dies, resigns, or is 
removed following impeachment, he remains President, the Vice President 
acts as President and there is no vice-presidential vacancy to be filled under 
Section 2.279   
 
issuing another recovery declaration, thereby activating the process again.”); Gustafson, supra note 
166, at 468 (noting that a Congressional “finding of Section 4 inability is not necessarily permanent” 
since the President may “appeal” such a declaration “an unlimited number of times.”); YALE LAW 
SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, supra note 8, at 70 (stating that President can repeat his “no 
inability” declaration following adverse decision of Congress). 
 274 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 94. 
 275 Id. at 101; see also id. at 101–02 (discussing Lindsay’s proposal which would allow Congress to later 
restore power to the President). 
 276 Id. at 101 (stating his view, and establishing in colloquy with Katzenbach, that H.R.J. Res. 1 would 
allow President to issue repeated “no inability” declarations). 
 277 Id. at 251; see also 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 45 (statement of Professor James C. Kirby, 
Jr.) (distinguishing involuntary disability proceeding from impeachment partly because under the 
latter the President can resume powers and duties of office). 
 278 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The 25th Amendment Option: Law and Politics, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 14, 2017, 
5:02 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/02/the-25th-amendment-option-law-and.html 
(suggesting that use of Section 4  might lead to a vice-presidential vacancy while recognizing that 
conclusion is not inevitable from the Amendment’s text). 
 279 See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 87 (statements of Sen. Birch Bayh and Rep. Richard H. 
Poff) (stating that presidential inability provisions do not create vice-presidential vacancy); see also 
FEERICK, supra note 10, at 109 (stating that legislative history makes clear that vice-presidential 
vacancy does not arise when the Vice President acts as President under Section 3 or 4); YALE LAW 
SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, supra note 8, at 72 (“[T]he Vice President’s assumption of the 
powers and duties as Acting President does not create such a ‘vacancy’ in the office of the Vice 
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F.  Can the President Reclaim Powers Immediately Upon His Declaration of Fitness? 
 One of the more troubling mistakes in the literature relates to the locus 
of presidential power during the four-day period under Section 4 between 
the time a President, who had previously had presidential powers transferred 
from him under that Section due to his inability, declares his fitness and the 
Vice President and Cabinet contest that declaration.  Some, though 
fortunately not many, recent writers have mistakenly concluded that the 
President can resume power immediately upon transmitting his declaration.  
The text of Section 4,280 its history, structure, and logic clearly provide that 
the Vice President retains presidential power during this period (unless he 
acquiesces in the President’s position).  
Various scholarly treatments that have addressed the question have 
concluded that the Vice President remains in power during the four-day 
period unless he agrees that the President has regained his capacity.281  A few 
writers of shorter pieces have, however, raised the possibility that the 
 
President.”). 
 280 The text of Section 4 reads: 
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the 
executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to 
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of 
his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office 
as Acting President. 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability 
exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a 
majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body 
as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore 
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration 
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon 
Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not 
in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written 
declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is 
required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue 
to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers 
and duties of his office. 
  U.S. CONST. amend XXV, § 4. 
 281 See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 10, at 118–19 (explaining that the President must wait the full four-
day period absent a conclusion by the Vice President and Cabinet to the contrary); BRIAN C. KALT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR PRESIDENTS AND THEIR ENEMIES 64, 
82 (2012) (concluding that better legal arguments leave Vice President in power but denying that 
President can resume power before four days expire even with the Vice President’s agreement); 
Gustafson, supra note 166, at 468–69, 469 n.41 (noting that the Acting President can retain authority 
for four days); YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, supra note 8, at 8, 48–50 (concluding 
that Congress always intended the Acting President retains authority during the four day period 
although less conclusive regarding whether the President can return earlier with acquiescence). 
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President could resume based simply on his declaration.  Professor David 
Faris reached that mistaken conclusion in August 2017.  He imagined 
that Pence became acting President under Section 4 only to have Trump 
respond with a declaration of his fitness.  At that point, Professor Faris 
explained, “the president gets to be the president again (boo!)” unless Pence 
and a Cabinet majority repeat their declaration that the President is unable 
within four days in which case Pence  is “once again” acting President subject 
to Congress’s ultimate decision.282  Professor Faris claimed that the 
Amendment created, rather than solved, “ambiguities and problems” since 
Section 4 “could be interpreted” to  allow the presidency to “change hands 
four times in the span of a month.  Who wrote this thing, anyway?”283  Professor 
Faris repeatedly conveyed his understanding that the President would briefly 
resume powers until the Vice President and Cabinet responded with a second 
disability declaration.  He so stated before the “boo!” comment.  He stated 
that upon reassertion of the Vice President and Cabinet majority of 
presidential inability during the four-day period the Vice President is “once 
again” acting president, signaling that he thinks the President’s assertion 
temporarily displaced the Vice President.  And the reference to “four” 
changes in a month assumes that after the Vice President initially acts as 
President (change 1) the President retakes power upon his declaration 
(change 2) and then loses it again when the Vice President and Cabinet 
contest his claim within four days (change 3) only to resume presidential 
power based on favorable congressional action (change 4).  In fact, power 
changes at most twice since changes 2 and 3 do not occur. 
 Jon Meacham, the distinguished Pulitzer Prize winning biographer, 
initially made the same mistake on January 11, 2018.284  In an otherwise 
thoughtful piece in Time, he mistakenly wrote that after the Vice President 
became acting President under Section 4, the President could “immediately 
reassume office” upon sending the prescribed writing but that “the Vice 
President again becomes acting President” if he and the Cabinet majority 
 
 282 David Faris, Opinion, Could the 25th Amendment Really Remove Trump from Office?, WEEK (Aug. 17, 2017), 
http://theweek.com/articles/718950/could-25th-amendment-really-remove-trump-from-office. 
 283 Id.; see also Shear, supra note 62 (incorrectly suggesting that Trump would return to his duties upon 
issuing a “no inability” letter but that Pence “would take over again” if Pence and the Cabinet 
reasserted their view that the President was disabled).  But see Prokop, supra note 267 (explaining 
that the Vice President continues to hold presidential power during the four-day period for the Vice 
President and Cabinet to contest the President’s declaration); Second Fordham University School 
of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession, supra note 7, at 927–28 (explaining that the President does 
not immediately resume power).  
 284 See Jon Meacham, Could the 25th Amendment Be Trump’s Downfall? Here’s How It Works, TIME (Jan. 11, 
2018), available at https://perma.cc/PK7Z-QCPU. 
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reassert their disagreement within four days.285  To his credit, Meacham 
acknowledged and corrected the earlier error so the version that now 
appears online accurately states that the Vice President continues to act 
as President during the period Section 4 provides for him and the other 
decision-makers to contest the President’s declaration.286 
Professor Brian Kalt, who has  written extensively about this issue, agrees 
that  the Vice President remains in control during the four-day period.  He 
has, however, described the relevant portion of Section 4 as “poorly 
drafted”287 and as “unclear”288 and has reported that commentators “have 
frequently misread it” as authorizing the President to resume power pending 
the Vice President/Cabinet response.289  Professor Kalt devoted a chapter in 
his fine book, Constitutional Cliffhangers,290 to this misreading which he rejects 
as “wrong.”291  Although  Professor Kalt points out the portion of Section 4 
could have been drafted better, he correctly concludes that the Vice 
President retains power during the four-day period.  Even though a few 
learned people have misconstrued Section 4 after apparently focusing  on the 
most immediately relevant textual fragment, on further examination the 
 
 285 Id. 
 286 See Meacham, supra note 267 (acknowledging that  the article initially had incorrectly characterized 
Section 4  and explaining that Vice President remains as acting President under Section 4 during 
the four day period “if sustained by a majority of the Cabinet (or the designated ‘other such body’) 
as the matter moves to its congressional phase.”). 
 287 Brian C. Kalt, The Unusual, Imperfect, Excellent Twenty-fifth Amendment, CONST. CTR., 
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-xxv/the-
unusual-imperfect-excellent-twenty-fifth-amendment-by-brian-kalt/interp/42 (last visited Sept. 
21, 2018). 
 288 KALT, supra note 281, at 63–64; see also id. at 67 (referring to the “poor drafting” of the four-day 
provision  as “serious”). 
 289 Brian Kalt, The Case Against Using the 25th Amendment to Get Rid of Trump, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 14, 2017, 
9:24 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/10/the-case-against-using-25th-
amendment-to-get-rid-of-trump.html;  see also Julia L. Ernst, John F. Kennedy and Constitutional Aspects 
of Presidential Succession, 76 U. PITT. L. REV. 63, 82 n.116 (2014) (arguing that the Section 4 language 
“contains sufficient ambiguity” that “a plausible argument” could be made that it supports the 
conclusion that the President resumes power on his declaration); Michael Walsh, What Is the 25th 
Amendment, and Could It Be Used to Remove Trump?, YAHOO NEWS (May 17, 2017), 
https://www.yahoo.com/news/25th-amendment-used-remove-trump-215814401.html 
(explaining that, according to  Kalt’s reading of the Amendment, “if the president were to say he is 
not disabled, he would not retake power immediately – because of the four-day waiting period”). 
 290 See generally KALT, supra note 281, at 61–82. 
 291 Kalt, supra note 289; see also KALT, supra note 281, at 64 (stating that evidence is “indisputable” that 
architects of Section 4 intended  the Vice President to exercise presidential powers  during the four 
day “waiting period”  and finding “ample evidence that Section 4 so provides.”); id. at 66 (stating 
that Section 4 creators intended the Vice President to continue to exercise presidential power) Kalt, 
supra note 289 (arguing that “best reading” of text and “clear message” of the legislative history is 
that Vice President retains power during the four-day period).   
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issue does not really present a close call.  The far better textual reading is that 
the Vice President remains in power,292 and when Section 4 is read in context 
and its full text is analyzed, when the record is considered for the light it sheds 
on the original public meaning, understanding and intent, and when 
structural arguments are considered, the only plausible reading is that the 
Vice President continues to act as President until he relinquishes presidential 
power to the President or Congress rules against him. 
Start with the text.  Section 4 provides that “when the President” using 
proper procedures “transmits . . . his written declaration that no inability 
exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless” the Vice 
President and Cabinet contest it within four days.293  The language makes 
the President’s resumption contingent upon the lack of a challenge within 
four days.  Those who infer that the President regains power at least 
temporarily read the text to allow him to “resume . . . unless [and until]” the 
Vice President and Cabinet majority dispute the President’s statement.294  
But Section 4 does not provide that upon his “no inability” declaration the 
President “shall resume” power “unless and until” the Vice President and 
Cabinet contest his declaration.295  The omission of “until” is significant, 
 
 292 Cf. KALT, supra note 281, at 68 (concluding that a reading that leaves the Vice President in power 
is more “natural” but an opposite reading is “possible.”); id. at 69 (concluding that the textual 
argument that leaves the Vice President in power during the four-day period is stronger). 
 293 U.S. CONST. amend XXV, § 4. 
 294 KALT, supra note 281, at 68 (acknowledging that this conclusion rests on reading “unless” to mean 
“unless and until” but viewing that reading as plausible but not most “natural” reading). 
 295 See also YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, supra note 8, at 48–49 (describing the argument 
as “tenuous” and pointing out that “unless” does not mean “‘unless and until’”).  In canvassing the 
possible arguments that a President might make that he immediately resumes power based on his 
“no inability” declaration, Professor Kalt suggests that he might contend that if Section 4 meant 
for the Vice President to continue acting as President during the four-day period the Amendment 
should  refer to him  as the acting president since “every other time that the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment assigns the powers of the presidency to the vice president, it calls him the acting 
president.”  KALT, supra note 281, at 68.  That argument is not persuasive.  The Vice President 
remains Vice President even when he is Acting President.  Although the Amendment states that 
when the President is declared disabled under Section 3 or 4, the Vice President performs as 
“Acting President,” it consistently refers to him as “Vice President” throughout the Amendment 
since that remains the office he fills.  The Amendment never uses “Acting President” as a subject.  
Moreover, in the use here in question, the Constitution is not “assign[ing]” presidential powers to 
the Vice President because it has already done so for the period in question when he “immediately 
assume[d]” those powers and duties.  The term “Acting President” is used simply as a title with 
respect to the Vice President’s discharge of presidential powers and duties.  The power and duty to 
determine, with the Cabinet (or “other body”), whether the President remains disabled 
notwithstanding his “no inability” declaration is not a presidential power and duty since the 
President can never exercise it.  It is uniquely a vice-presidential power and duty that can be 
exercised only in this situation by the Vice President during the four-day period.  Finally, use of 
“Acting President” might have introduced confusion since elsewhere the Constitution allows 
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especially since the Amendment uses that very word in Section 3 to terminate 
the Vice President’s service as acting President when the President transfers 
power voluntarily.296  If the Amendment envisioned the President resuming 
power immediately “until” being divested of that power by the Vice 
President’s challenge, it would have so provided.  It did not.  The use simply 
of “unless” signals that the President’s resumption depends on the 
nonoccurrence of the condition and is accordingly deferred. 
That conclusion is reinforced by the contrasting language Section 4 uses 
in connection with the initial declaration by the Vice President and Cabinet 
that the President is disabled as opposed to that following the President’s “no 
inability” statement.  The Vice President’s assumption of power occurs 
“immediately” upon transmission of the required declaration of the 
President’s inability.297  Conversely, the President’s resumption does not 
happen “immediately.”298  It is contingent on the absence of an appropriate 
challenge during the four-day period.  If Section 4 envisioned the President 
resuming presidential powers “immediately,” it would have so stated just as 
it did in connection with the Vice President’s assumption under Section 4.  
The omitted adverb signals that the President’s resumption is not immediate 
but is contingent on the Vice President and Cabinet not challenging him 
within four days. 
The argument that the President resumes power immediately, yet 
temporarily, encounters yet another textual problem.  Section 4 states that 
the Vice President “immediately” becomes acting President upon 
transmitting the initial declaration and later it provides that he “shall 
continue” in that role if (after an intra-executive branch dispute is presented 
to Congress) each house votes that the President is disabled within twenty-
 
Congress to designate another “officer” to act as President in case of a double vacancy or inability 
in the presidency or vice presidency, yet such an acting President is not intended to be a beneficiary 
of, or participant in, Section 3 or 4. 
 296 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3 (“Whenever the President transmits to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that 
he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written 
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as 
Acting President.” (emphasis added)). 
 297 Id. § 4 (“Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive 
departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration 
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall 
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.” (emphasis added)). 
 298 See also KALT, supra note 281, at 68–69 (observing the possibility that the failure of Section 4 to 
provide that President “immediately” resumes exercise of presidential powers upon declaring her 
fitness suggests that Vice President retains power). 
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one days, or, alternatively, that the President “shall resume” presidential 
powers if either house does not cast a two-thirds vote against the President 
during the specified time period.299  If the Vice President is to “continue” if 
Congress votes in his favor or the President is to “resume” if Congress does 
not, the Vice President has to be acting as President during the roughly three-
week period Section 4 allows Congress to consider the issue.  But between 
the Vice President’s “immediate” assumption of presidential powers and 
duties when he and the Cabinet majority first declare the President “unable” 
and his later continuation (or the President’s resumption) after Congress 
votes, Section 4 nowhere provides that the Vice President commences or 
resumes acting as President.  If the President’s “no disability” declaration 
shifted power back to the President immediately, the Amendment would 
need to return power to the Vice President before the twenty-one-day period 
Congress has to decide so that the Vice President can “continue” if Congress 
votes against the President or, so the President can “resume” if either house 
supports her position.  After all, a transfer of presidential power is a rather 
consequential event and the Amendment  does not leave such a transition to 
inference.  Yet, Section 4 nowhere provides for power to return to the Vice 
President during that time period.  That omission is no coincidence; it 
confirms what is otherwise apparent, that the Vice President continues to act 
as President during the four-day period.  The Vice President has to continue 
exercising presidential power during the four-day period or else he would not 
be holding it during the twenty-one-day period as the language contemplates. 
Finally, the existence of the twenty-one-day period for Congress to decide 
further impeaches the interpretation that the President could return to power 
immediately on his own “no inability” declaration.  No one doubts that the 
Vice President acts as President during the twenty-one-day period, a 
conclusion cemented by the  “continues” or  “resume[s]” formulation.  Yet, 
only the most bizarre interpretation of Section 4 would make the President 
wait for twenty-one days for Congress to decide whether he can “resume,” 
but would allow him to “resume” immediately upon his mere declaration 
and before an executive branch response is possible without an explicit 
textual statement to that effect.  Considering the entire clause, not just a 
fragment, makes clear that unless the Vice President and Cabinet majority 
fail to contest the President’s “no inability” declaration within the four day 
period the Vice President continues to exercise presidential powers and 
duties from the time he initially assumes them until Congress fails to sustain 
his position within twenty-one days.   
 
 299 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.  
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The legislative history provides even stronger evidence of the drafters’ 
intent, and of the understanding and public meaning of the provision.300  
Indeed, it is so overwhelming that it leads inexorably to the conclusion that 
the Vice President remains in power during the four-day period, and 
accordingly it is recounted here more fully than it has previously been 
presented.   
To be sure, the original text of S.J. Res. 139 did a better job of conveying 
that the President could not immediately resume presidential powers upon 
his mere declaration.  It used language largely taken from H.R.J. Res. 161 
which a bipartisan group of legislators had introduced in 1958.301  It provided 
that “Whenever the President makes public announcement in writing that 
his inability has terminated, he shall resume the discharge of the powers and 
duties of his office on the seventh day after making such announcement, or 
at such earlier time after such announcement as he and the Vice President 
may determine.”302  It further provided that if the Vice President, with the 
concurrence of the majority of the heads of the executive departments “in 
office at the time of such announcement [by the president],”303 transmitted 
a declaration to Congress denying that the President’s inability had ended, 
Congress would “consider the issue.”304  That formulation delayed the 
President’s resumption for seven days absent the Vice President’s agreement 
to an earlier return but it presented a different problem.  As written, however, 
if Congress took longer than seven days to resolve the intra-executive branch 
dispute the President would return to power, thereby presenting the risk that 
a disabled President might exercise presidential power. 
 
 
 300 See KALT, supra note 281, at 69 (concluding that legislative history makes it “abundantly clear” that 
creators of Section 4 intended the Vice President to continue exercising presidential powers); id. at 
70 (stating that intended meaning that the Vice President continue to exercise presidential powers 
“was completely clear” to Bayh and to Congress.); id. at 71 (recognizing that the House “understood 
completely” that the Vice President remained in power); id. (stating that as “evidence of legislative 
intent goes,” evidence that Vice President remains in power during the four day period is “as clear 
and definitive as it gets.”). 
 301 H.R.J. Res. 161, 85th Cong. (1958).   
 302 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 11–12 (presenting text of original version of S.J. Res. 139, 
section 5). 
 303 Professor Kalt suggests that this phrase would have prevented a President from “stacking the 
cabinet.” KALT, supra note 281, at 69.  Yet, the purpose of the limitation seems to have been to 
prevent the Vice President from using Cabinet changes to entrench himself in power since he, not 
the President, would have exercised presidential powers and duties during the seven-day waiting 
period.   
 304 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 11–12 (presenting text of original version of S.J. Res. 139, 
section 5). 
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The ABA consensus that developed in January 1964, the month after 
Bayh introduced S.J. Res. 139, deviated from Bayh’s initial formulation in 
some respects, including its rejection of the possibility that the President 
could retake power after the waiting period if Congress had not acted.  
During his February 25, 1964, testimony, Paul Freund, a member of the 
ABA panel, stated that the Vice President would continue to serve as acting 
President if the President and Vice President/Cabinet disagreed about his 
fitness since “the office ought not to be at the hazard of an incapable 
President.”305  John Feerick, another key member of the ABA group also 
expressed this conclusion in his testimony three days later.  He explained: 
Fifth, the panel recommended that the President should be able to resume 
his powers and duties upon his own declaration in writing.  Because of the 
possibility that a President might say he was able when he was not, it was the 
panel’s consensus that the Vice President, subject to approval by a majority 
of the Cabinet, should have the power to prevent him from acting in such a 
case.   
In a case where the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet disagree 
with the President’s declaration of recovery, review by Congress would be 
required.  The Vice President would continue to act in the interim, however.  
It would take a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress to keep the 
President from resuming his powers and duties.306 
Eisenhower’s March 1964 letter to Bayh also assumed that the Vice President 
would continue to act as President during any period when the President’s 
capacity was disputed by the Vice President and the Cabinet.307 
Those hearings produced an amended version of S.J. Res. 139 which 
included language in its Section 5 which closely resembled that which was 
later moved to the end of Section 4 in the ultimate Amendment.  The major 
differences pertinent here between the version of S.J. Res. 139 that passed 
the Senate in September 1964 and the eventual Amendment were that the 
S.J. Res. 139 version allowed the Vice President and Cabinet only two, rather 
than four, days to contest the President’s declaration of fitness, and it 
 
 305 Id. at 130. 
 306 Id. at 152; see also Feerick, supra note 100, at 495 (“Because of the possibility that a President might 
say he was able when he was not, it was the panel’s consensus that the Vice-President, subject to 
approval by a majority of the Cabinet, should have the power to prevent him from acting in such a 
case.”); John D. Feerick, Presidential Inability: The Problem and a Solution, 50 A.B.A. J. 321, 324 (1964) 
(explaining that ABA consensus allowed the Vice President and Cabinet to “prevent” the President 
from reclaiming power based simply on his declaration and the Vice President would continue to act 
as President so the presidency “would not be filled by one whose capacity was seriously challenged.”). 
 307 See 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 232 (“Should there be any dispute between the President 
and the Vice President as to whether the former is ready to resume his duties and the Cabinet 
should agree with the Vice President, then the Vice President should continue to serve for the time 
being.”). 
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required Congress to “immediately decide” the dispute rather than impose a 
twenty-one-day deadline.  The new version of S.J. Res. 139 replaced the 
original language that the President would “resume the discharge of the 
powers and duties of his office on the seventh day” with the current “he shall 
resume . . . unless” formulation and made clear that the Vice President, not 
the President, would exercise presidential powers and duties during the 
period in which Congress could decide in part by replacing the prior 
language with the “Vice President shall continue” or the “President shall 
resume” alternatives.308  In addition to following the ABA approach, the 
drafters apparently sought concision309 for they worried about the length of 
the Amendment. 
The new language in S.J. Res. 139 was not intended to allow the 
President to resume merely upon his statement.  To the contrary, its apparent 
purpose was to make sure that he could not retake presidential powers and 
duties even during the longer period given Congress to act until it confirmed 
his ability (unless the Vice President acquiesced).  The Senate Report which 
accompanied S.J. Res. 139 made clear that the President could resume 
presidential power only after the process was completed in his favor, not 
upon his declaration.  Although it explained that Section 5 allowed the 
President “to resume the powers and duties of the office” upon transmission 
to Congress of the no inability declaration, it quickly stated that resumption 
was subject to the Vice President and Cabinet sharing that conclusion.310  It 
provided: “However, should the Vice President and a majority of the heads 
of the executive departments feel that the President is unable, then they could 
prevent the President from resuming the powers and duties of the office by 
transmitting their written declaration so stating to the Congress within 2 
days.”311  The use of “prevent,” a term from Feerick’s 1964 testimony,312 
made clear that the President does not resume, but then lose, presidential 
powers and duties during the two-day waiting period that version of S.J. Res. 
139 allowed.  The President does not resume at all during the period the Vice 
President has to consider the issue.  Instead, the Vice President continues to 
act as President during the (then) two-day period.  The report continued by 
 
 308 See S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 2 (1964) (presenting amended version of S.J. Res. 139). 
 309 See, e.g., KALT, supra note 281, at 70 (attributing the editing to an effort “to make the amendment 
more concise”); YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, supra note 8, at 49 (concluding that 
edits in the Senate version were intended to shorten the Amendment rather than alter its meaning). 
 310 S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 12 (1964). 
 311 Id. 
 312 See 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 152 (“Because of the possibility that a President might 
say he was able when he was not . . . the Vice President, subject to approval by a majority of the 
Cabinet, should have the power to prevent him from acting in such a case.” (emphasis added)). 
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using language  that confirmed that the Vice President remained as acting 
President during the congressional decision period.313 
S.J. Res. 1, which Bayh introduced in January 1965, tracked the final 
version of S.J. Res. 139 in this respect.  In testimony on the constitutional 
meaning of S.J. Res. 1 on January 29, 1965, Katzenbach stated his 
understanding that its provisions contemplated that except where the 
President had declared his own disability the Vice President would continue 
acting as President notwithstanding the President’s “no inability” 
declaration.  Initially he stated his assumption that the Section 5 procedure 
whereby the Vice President and Cabinet could challenge the President’s 
resumption only applied when the President had been declared disabled 
without his consent.  When he had declared his own inability, “he could 
restore himself immediately to the powers and duties” of the presidency by 
his written statement to that effect.314  Katzenbach’s testimony rested on his 
implicit understanding that the two-day waiting period of Section 5 
precluded a president from resuming presidential powers “immediately.”  
Katzenbach stated his further assumption “that even where disability was 
established originally pursuant to section 4, the President could resume the 
powers and duties of his Office immediately with the concurrence of the 
Acting President, and would not be obliged to await the expiration of the 
two-day period mentioned in section 5.”315  Katzenbach’s conclusion on that 
point also showed his implicit understanding that unless the Vice President 
was earlier convinced of the President’s fitness, the Vice President continued 
as acting President during the (then) two-day period.  Katzenbach referred 
to the Vice President as acting President and said the Vice President 
“presumably is continuing to act” until Congress decides.316  He said the 
Amendment envisioned the Vice President continuing to act as President 
until Congress declined to support him rather than allowing the President to 
resume powers upon his declaration unless both the Cabinet majority and 
two-thirds of Congress vote against him.317 
 
 313 S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 12 (1964) (making clear that Vice President continues to act as President 
during the period in which Congress considers an intra-executive branch dispute on the President’s 
inability); see also 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 106, at 152 (testimony of John D. Feerick) (“In a 
case where the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet disagree with the President’s 
declaration of recovery, review by Congress would be required.  The Vice President would continue 
to act in the interim, however.”) 
 314 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 76, at 10. 
 315 Id.; see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 99, 107 (statement of Att’y Gen. Nicholas 
Katzenbach). 
 316 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 76, at 16. 
 317 Id. at 17. 
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In discussion with Katzenbach during the Senate hearings, Bayh 
explained that the Amendment was striving to achieve two things—to 
prevent a disabled President from acting as President for even a short time 
and to keep the process as simple as possible.318  Bayh thought to minimize 
transfers it was better not to allow the President to resume power upon his 
simple declaration in a situation where a challenge might occur.319   
Feerick was troubled that the language in Section 5 of H.R.J. Res. 1 was 
not sufficiently “clear” regarding who exercised presidential powers during 
the period between the President’s “no inability” declaration and the Vice 
President’s communication of his disagreement.  In a letter of February 7, 
1965, to Representative Richard Poff on the eve of the House Judiciary 
Committee hearings, Feerick raised this issue.  He wrote that “[t]he Vice-
President is intended to act in the period, I am sure, but it can be forceably 
[sic] argued that the language does not and will not permit him to do so.”320  
Since Section 5 addressed “an extraordinary case such as that of an insane 
President” Feerick thought clarification desirable to preclude such a disabled 
President from reclaiming presidential powers and firing Cabinet members 
to avert use of the provision.321  As a scholar of presidential inability, Feerick 
raised this issue out of an abundance of caution “because I am only too 
mindful of what the words ‘the same’ did”322 in creating a problem that the 
proposed Amendment was, in part, designed to resolve. 
The process of writing an illuminating legislative history had only just 
begun, and what followed made clear the widespread intent and 
understanding that under the proposal the Vice President remained in power 
during the waiting period.  In issuing the Report which accompanied S.J. 
Res. 1 on February 10, 1965, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary went 
out of its way to address the circumstances in which the President could 
reclaim his or her power323 and to clarify that when presidential powers and 
duties were transferred to the Vice President under Sections 4 and 5 of S.J. 
 
 318 Id.  
 319 Id. at 17–18. 
 320 Letter from John D. Feerick to Hon. Richard Poff, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 7, 1965) 
(on file with the Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History), available at 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=twentyfifth_amendm
ent_correspondence. 
 321 Id. 
 322 Id. 
 323 See S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 3 (1965) (“In its discussion of the ramifications of section 5, the committee 
considered it important to add additional stress to the interpretation of two questions which might 
arise: (1) Who has the powers and duties of the office of the President while the provisions of section 
5 are being implemented? (2) Under what sense of urgency is Congress required to act in carrying 
out provisions of this section?”). 
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Res. 1, the Vice President retained power until Congress decided in the 
President’s favor.  Addressing the point which Katzenbach had suggested in 
his recent testimony, the Report distinguished the provisions regarding 
presidential resumption of power depending on whether the initial transfer 
occurred under Section 3 or 4.  A President who transferred power under 
Section 3 could immediately reclaim powers by simple declaration in part to 
encourage such voluntary transfers where appropriate.324  Yet, when power 
was transferred under Sections 4 and 5, the Vice President would continue 
to act as President until Congress decided adversely to him.325  Although the 
President could resume his powers if the Vice President and Cabinet majority 
agreed that he had regained capacity, the Report made it clear that this 
group could “prevent the President from resuming” those powers if they 
objected within two days.326   
When Bayh testified before the House Judiciary Committee on February 
9, 1965, he stated that Section 5 of S.J. Res. 1 allowed the Vice President to 
divest himself of presidential powers immediately but that he would 
otherwise continue to act as President during the two-day period allowed for 
a challenge.327  Bayh stated that under Section 5, notwithstanding a 
presidential “no inability” declaration, “[t]he Vice President continues to act 
as President until the Congress decides the issue.  We have given this a 
considerable amount of study and we have tried to arrive at a situation where 
there is a minimum amount of change back and forth.”328   
 
 324 Id. (“Under the terms of section 3 a President who voluntarily transfers his powers and duties to the 
Vice President may resume these powers and duties by making a written declaration of his ability 
to perform the powers and duties of his office and transmitting such declaration to the President of 
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.  This will reduce the reluctance of the 
President to utilize the provisions of this section in the event he fears it would be difficult for him to 
regain his powers and duties once he has voluntarily relinquished them.”). 
 325 Id. (“However, the intent of section 5 is that the Vice President is to continue to exercise the powers 
and duties of the office of Acting President until a determination on the President’s inability is made 
by Congress.  It is also the intention of the committee that the Congress should act swiftly in making 
this determination, but with sufficient opportunity to gather whatever evidence it determined 
necessary to make such a final determination.”). 
 326 Id. at 14 (“Section 5 of the proposed amendment would permit the President to resume the powers 
and duties of the office upon his transmission to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives of his written declaration that no inability existed.  However, should the 
Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments feel that the 
President is unable, then they could prevent the President from resuming the powers and duties of 
the office by transmitting their written declaration so stating to the President of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives within 2 days.”). 
 327 See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 41 (“[T]he Vice President—if he has the support of a 
majority of the Cabinet—could retain the powers and duties for 2 days following the President’s 
declaration.”).   
 328 Id. at 58; see also id. at 63 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that Vice President “can continue 
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When the Senate debated the proposal ten days later, the Republican 
leader, Senator Everett Dirksen, questioned whether Section 5 of S.J. Res. 1 
would force the President to wait two days before recovering presidential 
powers “even though he had voluntarily relinquished it[.]”329  Significantly, 
Dirksen understood that under S.J. Res. 1 the Vice President normally 
retained power during the challenge period but thought that practice should 
not apply when the President voluntarily made the disability decision under 
Section 3.  Bayh assured him that under Section 3 the President could 
reassume presidential powers by his declaration, implicitly distinguishing it 
from a Section 4 situation.330 
When Senator Frank Lausche asked whether, after the President’s 
incapacity had been declared by the Vice President and Cabinet, the 
President would remain in office pending a determination by the Vice 
President, Cabinet, and Congress, Bayh replied that he would not, but that, 
on the contrary, “whenever” the Vice President and Cabinet majority 
declare the president disabled, “the Vice President would assume the powers 
and duties of the office while the issue was being tried.”331  Bayh explained 
that the Amendment sought “to try to prevent a back-and-forth ping-pong 
sort of situation.”332  The proposal would limit the number of transfers and 
promote continuity which “should be basic.”333 
During Senate debate on February 19, 1965, Bayh accepted Hruska’s 
amendment to extend from two to seven days the period the Vice President 
and Cabinet had to contest the President’s “no inability” declaration.  When 
Senator Gordon Allott asked who would act as President during the seven-
day period, Bayh replied “The Vice President, the Acting President.”334  
Bayh explained that whenever the Vice President and Cabinet declared the 
President disabled, there would be sufficient question about the President’s 
mental capacity so that the Vice President should continue acting until 
Congress decided.335  Moreover, leaving the Vice President as acting 
President would reduce the number of transfers of presidential power.336  If 
the President issued a “no inability” declaration, he could not resume office 
 
to act beyond a reasonable period” only with support of two-thirds of Congress); id. at 69 (imagining 
a hypothetical premised on Vice President acting through entire challenge and decision time). 
 329 111 CONG. REC. 3268 (1965). 
 330 Id. at 3271. 
 331 Id. at 3284. 
 332 Id.  
 333 Id. 
 334 Id. at 3285.   
 335 Id.  
 336 Id.  
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until the expiration of the time for the Vice President and Cabinet to contest 
that declaration, then seven days,337 unless the Vice President and President 
agreed to a quicker return.338 
In House hearings, in addition to Bayh’s testimony described above, other 
principal architects of the measure also confirmed the understanding that the 
Vice President remained in power during the period permitted him to 
challenge the President’s “no inability” declaration.  Katzenbach reiterated 
that S.J. Res 1 and H.R.J. Res. 1 left the Vice President as acting President 
after the President issued a “no inability” declaration unless either the Vice 
President agreed with his position or two days expired without the Vice 
President and Cabinet challenging the President’s position.339  He understood 
Section 5, which then gave the Vice President two days to contest the 
President’s “no inability” declaration, as imposing “a 48-hour, in effect, 
delay” during which the Vice President continued to act as President.340  So 
did former Attorney General Brownell.  When Representative John V.  
Lindsay asked Brownell why H.R.J. Res. 1 provided that once the Vice 
President took over as acting President he would remain so until Congress 
reversed him,341 Brownell stated that he preferred the H.R.J. Res. 1 approach 
because it left the Vice President as acting President for the “very brief period” 
until there was an independent determination that “the President was able to 
come back . . . .”342  Brownell also thought leaving the Vice President in 
power would minimize “jumping back and forth.”343  Brownell’s testimony 
confirmed his (and Lindsay’s) understanding that the Vice President remained 
in power as well as repeated the logic Bayh had earlier given. 
The report of the House Judiciary Committee on H.R.J. Res. 1 on March 
24, 1965, expressed a consistent interpretation.  In explaining revisions made 
following hearings, the report provided in part that when the President 
transferred power voluntarily under Section 3, his “no inability” declaration 
terminated the vice president’s exercise of presidential powers.  “The right of 
challenge would be reserved for cases” when the Vice President assumed 
 
 337 Id.  
 338 Id.  
 339 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 99–100; see also id.  at 107 (stating that with the concurrence 
of the Vice President, the President could resume presidential powers during the two-day period 
provided under Section 5 of H.R.J. Res. 1) 
 340 Id. at 99. 
 341 Id. at 248, 250. 
 342 Id. at 250; see also id. at 243 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Herbert Brownell) (stating that the Vice 
President would remain in power during the two-day period unless he agreed to an earlier 
resumption of power by the President). 
 343 Id. at 252. 
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power under Section 4.344  The House combined former Section 5 with 
Section 4 to emphasize that the “challenge” procedure only applied to 
Section 4.345  The committee understood that the Vice President’s right to 
contest the President’s “no inability” declaration carried with it the right to 
remain in office during the period in which the contest could be raised and, 
if it were, during the subsequent decision period.346    
The House Judiciary Committee had provided that the Vice President 
and Cabinet majority must lodge a challenge to the President’s declaration of 
his ability within two days and added a ten-day period for Congress to decide 
any intra-executive branch dispute.  “Otherwise,” it said, “the President, 
having declared himself able, will resume his powers and duties.”347  The use 
of “[o]therwise” made clear that the President did not resume based upon his 
mere declaration but had to wait to see whether his executive branch 
associates challenged him and, if they did, whether Congress ruled in his favor 
or the ten days passed with no  ruling adverse to him.  In explaining the 
operation of Section 4 once the Vice President and Cabinet majority 
challenged the President’s statement, the Report stated that:  
[T]he language of former Section 5 is further amended by providing that in 
such event the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office 
unless the Congress within 10 days after receipt of such declaration of 
Presidential inability determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the 
President is in fact unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.348 
It is telling that the Report used virtually the same formulation (“shall 
resume . . . unless”) as the Amendment used regarding the earlier intra-
executive branch contest period.  It was understood that the Vice President 
would act as President during the ten-day period for Congress to decide, and 
the use of the same formulation signaled that he would also act under the 
contest period in H.R.J. Res. 1. 
During the floor debates in the House, various architects of the 
Amendment made clear that the Vice President acted as President during 
the decision period.349  When Celler was specifically asked who would 
 
 344 H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 2 (1965); see id. at 3 (explaining that the committee intended “that the 
procedure provided by [Section 4] relate[ ] only to cases in which Presidential inability has been 
declared by others than the President.”). 
 345 Id. at 2–3. 
 346 Id. 
 347 Id. at 3. 
 348 Id.  
 349 See 111 CONG. REC. 7938 (1965) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler) (“In other words, if there is a 
dispute, as I stated, in the interest of continuity of executive power and stability, the Vice President 
takes over and remains in the office as Acting President until Congress acts. . . . Thus we escape the 
danger of a disabled President carrying on for even a short while.”). 
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discharge presidential powers and duties during the period when the Vice 
President and Cabinet were deciding whether to contest the President’s no 
inability claim, he stated that the Vice President would continue to serve as 
acting President during this period and quoted Katzenbach to that effect.350  
When pressed, Celler said that the Vice President as acting President would 
“be in the saddle unless he agrees the President is fully restored.”351  
Representative Robert Duncan, Celler’s interlocutor, confirmed the 
substance of their exchange when he summarized that unless the Vice 
President acquiesced in the President’s no inability claim, the Vice President 
“would continue as Acting President during all intervals of time necessary for 
the Cabinet and the President to transmit their letter and the Congress to 
take such action as may be necessary.”352  
Lindsay, a member of the House Judiciary Committee, stated his 
understanding that the Vice President retained power until Congress decided 
adverse to his position.  Lindsay recognized that “that word ‘unless’ is the 
key.  It is very significant.”353  He disclosed that in committee deliberations 
he preferred a formulation that would have allowed the President to hold 
power unless Congress reversed him by a two-thirds vote but that H.R.J. Res. 
1 “provides just the reverse, that the Vice President, on his declaration, 
backed by a majority of the Cabinet, retain power unless he is reversed by 
the Congress.”354  Lindsay had offered an amendment in committee to flip 
the procedure but was defeated.355  Representative Arch Moore of the House 
Judiciary Committee also understood that Section 4 allowed the Vice 
President to remain in power until Congress ruled against him, a resolution 
he opposed.356  Moore thought that the President should be able “to simply 
state he is capable of reassuming his office” and “that he shall then reassume” 
presidential powers.357   
Moore, in fact, offered a floor amendment to change Section 4 to provide 
that the President would immediately resume presidential powers and duties 
upon issuing his “no inability” declaration.  The Vice President and Cabinet 
 
 350 Id. at 7939. 
 351 Id.  
 352 Id. at 7939–40; see also id. at 7941–42 (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff) (explaining that the initial 
declaration by the Vice President and Cabinet shifts powers to the Vice President with the 
President’s remedy being to seek Congressional review to restore him). 
 353 Id. at 7948. 
 354 Id.  
 355 Id.  
 356 Id. at 7949. 
 357 Id.; see also id. at 7956 (statement of Rep. William J. Randall) (stating that Section 4 prevented two 
people from simultaneously asserting presidential powers); id. at 7958–59 (statement of Rep. 
Rodney M. Love) (arguing that Section 4 as revised deferred President’s resumption of powers until 
after Vice President and Cabinet failed to respond). 
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could contest the President’s declaration, and Congress would resolve it, but 
during those time periods, the President, not the Vice President, would 
discharge presidential powers, under Moore’s proposal. 
Moore, of course, would not have offered this proposal unless he 
understood that Section 4 allowed the Vice President to act as President 
notwithstanding the President’s “no inability” assertion.  Not a single 
representative contradicted Moore’s understanding of Section 4 during the 
debate on his proposal.  Some reiterated the acknowledged interpretation 
that the Vice President retained presidential powers during the period in 
which the Vice President and Cabinet could decide whether or not to 
challenge the President’s “no inability” declaration and during the period 
Congress took to decide, and beyond if Congress ruled against the 
President.358  Moore’s motion was defeated, 58 to 122.359 
Representative James Corman explained the reasoning behind H.R.J. 
Res. 1’s approach of deferring presidential resumption of powers.  It would 
guard against the risk that the President’s “no inability” declaration was 
unfounded and that the President was, in fact, mentally unsound.360  It would 
prevent a situation in which there was uncertainty as to who was entitled to 
discharge presidential powers.361  It would obviate the danger that the 
President, having resumed power, could discharge Cabinet members and 
accordingly prevent further action by Congress to determine whether the 
President was disabled.362  Finally, the framers wanted to reduce the transfers 
of presidential powers.  By allowing the Vice President to continue to act, 
they minimized the number of such transfers.363 
The Conference Committee chose a four-day period as a compromise 
between the two-day period in the House version and the seven-day period 
in the Senate version.  Poff, too, stated during the final House debate that 
the four-day period was “an outside limitation” and that “it is not necessary 
that the President wait 4 days to resume his office if he and the Vice President 
mutually agree that he do so earlier.”364  Implicit in Poff’s statement was the 
 
 358 See, e.g., id. at 7965 (statement of Rep. James C. Corman) (“[W]hen we get into a dispute between 
the President . . . and the Vice President and the Cabinet . . .  the Vice President will retain power 
for 2 days.  If the dispute continues beyond 2 days, Congress must act within 10 days.”). 
 359 Id. at 7966. 
 360 Id. at 7965; see also id. (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler) (opposing Moore’s amendment because 
it might allow a President who was “nutty as a fruitcake” or “utterly insane” to resume presidential 
powers during the two-day period). 
 361 Id. (statement of Rep. James C. Corman). 
 362 Id. (statements of Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. and Rep. James C. Corman). 
 363 Id. at 7966 (statement of Rep. Robert McClory). 
 364 Id. at 15,214 (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff). 
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understanding that absent a vice-presidential agreement, the Vice President 
continues to act as President during the four-day period. 
When Bayh presented the Conference Report to the Senate, he noted 
that it changed the proposed Amendment from that the Senate approved 
earlier that year by making specific that a President who declared his inability 
voluntarily under Section 3 could reclaim powers by a simple declaration.365  
The absence of any similar comment regarding an involuntary transfer under 
Section 4 signaled that no such resumption accompanied a simple “no 
inability” declaration in that context.  Significantly, Bayh twice described the 
four-day period in which the Vice President and Cabinet could contest a 
presidential “no inability” declaration as a “waiting period” before the 
President could resume presidential powers and duties.366 
Feerick articulated the same understanding in two articles that were 
widely circulated during the ratification period.  In the A.B.A. Journal, he 
wrote that if the President, having been declared disabled under Section 4, 
announced his recovery, “he then would have to wait four days before he 
could resume his powers and duties” while the Vice President and Cabinet 
assessed the situation.367  He might assume his powers and duties before the 
four days ended if the Vice President and Cabinet agreed.368  Feerick 
explained that the Vice President would continue to act as President during 
any period in which the President’s ability was challenged “so that the powers 
and duties of President would never be in the hands of a person whose 
capacity had been seriously challenged.”369  In a December 1965 law review 
article, Feerick wrote that “the President could announce his own recovery 
but he would then have to wait four days before resuming his powers and 
duties.”370  Unless the Vice President and Cabinet agreed to the President’s 
earlier resumption,371 “[t]he Vice-President would continue to act as 
President, pending the decision of Congress, so that the powers and duties of 
President would never be in the hands of a person whose capacity had been 
seriously challenged,” Feerick explained.372 
In addition to the textual arguments, the legislative history confirms in 
overwhelming fashion that the Vice President possesses presidential powers 
 
 365 Id. at 15,378. 
 366 Id.   
 367 Feerick, supra note 203, at 917. 
 368 Id. 
 369 Id.   
 370 Feerick, supra note 124, at 200. 
 371 Id. at 200–01.  
 372 Id. at 201; see also American Bar Association & John D. Feerick, supra note 203, at 4 (explaining that 
under Section 4 President resumes powers only if his declaration is not contested in four days by 
the Vice President and majority of the Cabinet). 
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and duties during the four-day period.  Committee reports expressed that 
intent as did statements by the chief proponents of the measure in both the 
Senate (Bayh) and the House (Celler), a past (Brownell) and current 
(Katzenbach) attorney general to whom legislators looked for legal guidance, 
and key witnesses (Eisenhower, Freund, Feerick), as well as others.  The 
legislative history also illuminates that the provision was understood in a 
manner consistent with the intent and provides evidence regarding the 
meaning a reasonable person in the mid-1960s would have given the words.  
In addition to the evidence recounted above, no one suggested during 
legislative discussions that the provision allowed the President to return to 
power immediately upon his mere “no inability” declaration alone rather 
than await the response of the Vice President and Cabinet.373  On the 
contrary, two proponents of immediate presidential resumption (Moore and 
Lindsay) complained that H.R.J. Res. 1 made the President wait and sought 
at different junctures, unsuccessfully, to amend the proposal.  The record and 
various articles explaining that the Vice President remained in power were 
widely circulated during the ratification period. 
The legislative record also articulated the structural considerations that 
informed the decision to make the President wait before resuming power.  
The presidential inability provisions reflect an interest in having a 
functioning person discharging presidential powers at all times.  Until an 
authoritative decision-maker (like the Vice President, Cabinet, or Congress) 
blessed the President’s return, the safest course and the one consistent with 
that objective required the Vice President to continue.  Moreover, an interest 
in stability argued for minimizing change.  Bayh later wrote that the 
committee had considered the “touchy” issue of whether the President or 
Vice President would discharge presidential powers during a period in which 
the President’s capacity was unresolved.  Bayh and the committee had 
concluded that “from the time the Vice President assumed the powers and 
duties of the President until Congress decided the issue, the Vice President 
should continue to act.”374  That resolution would minimize uncertainty 
regarding the locus of presidential power and ensure that “a President gone 
berserk could not reclaim his powers and duties even for a few hours, thus 
doing irreparable damage before Congress was able to decide on his 
 
 373 Questions to Bayh, Celler, or other Amendment architects during legislative hearings and debates 
regarding the meaning of Section 4 cannot, of course, be taken as indicating ambiguity or confusion 
unless the questioner so states since often such questions are designed to make legislative history, to 
educate the questioner or others regarding the operation of a provision, to set a foundation for 
further discussion of a topic, or simply to restate what is already clear. 
 374 BAYH, supra note 94, at 272–73.   
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inability.”375  Bayh’s statement demonstrated the compelling logic behind 
making the President wait until some authoritative voice confirmed his 
capacity, and that logic was consistent with the better reading of the text and 
the legislative history.   
Finally, leaving the Vice President in power accords with common sense, 
which is not simply a guide to living but an instrument of constitutional 
interpretation.  So Chief Justice John Marshall taught nearly two centuries 
ago in McCulloch v. Maryland.376  Marshall reasoned that absent a clear 
constitutional statement to the contrary, the Constitution should be 
interpreted reasonably in a manner to facilitate, not to frustrate, the 
realization of its purposes.377 
The interpretation that would allow the President to resume immediately 
invites the following nightmarish hypothetical situation  which would 
frustrate the entire purpose of Section 4.  Imagine that a moment after the 
Vice President and Cabinet act under Section 4 to transfer presidential 
powers and duties from a deranged and delusional President, that same 
apparently compromised President resumes power by transmitting his simple 
declaration.  Possessed again with presidential powers and duties absent any 
meaningful check, he fires the Cabinet, evicts the Vice President from the 
West Wing of the White House, and orders American troops to attack Great 
Britain and Canada.  The absurdity of this situation on several levels 
impeaches the interpretation that would allow the President to resume 
immediately on his own determination.  Not only would it return to power a 
President just declared deranged, it would allow him to circumvent the very 
checks Section 4 imposes against a President who seeks to reclaim power 
while disabled, namely the review  of the Vice President and Cabinet and 
two-thirds of each house of Congress, the ultimate check.  Absent 
unequivocal constitutional language mandating that the President could 
return with no review, McCulloch teaches that the Constitution should always 
favor a result that would advance, not destroy, its purposes.  
 
 375 Id. at 273. 
 376 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 377 See id. at 408–09 (“Can we adopt that construction, (unless the words imperiously require it,) which 
would impute to the framers of that instrument, when granting these powers for the public good, 
the intention of impeding their exercise by withholding a choice of means?  If, indeed, such be the 
mandate of the constitution, we have only to obey; but that instrument does not profess to 
enumerate the means by which the powers it confers may be executed; nor does it prohibit the 
creation of a corporation, if the existence of such a being be essential to the beneficial exercise of 
those powers.”); id. at 415 (“It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers, to 
insure, as far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution.”). 
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On at least two occasions, the Department of Justice378 has issued 
opinions that confirm that the Vice President remains in power during the 
four-day period.  A few days after the attempt to assassinate President 
Reagan, Theodore Olson, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal 
Counsel, issued a memorandum for the Attorney General in which he 
referred to Section 4’s “mechanism” which allowed the Vice President, 
Cabinet, and Congress “to override the President” in resuming the powers 
and duties of his office.379  “Under Section 4, the Vice President remains 
Acting President until the issue is resolved,” Olson wrote.380  Four years later, 
after describing Section 4, an OLC opinion stated that the President could 
resume his powers and duties upon his declaration “unless, within four days” 
the Vice President and Cabinet contest his declaration, thereby requiring 
Congress to resolve the issue.381  “The Vice President would remain Acting 
President until the congressional vote.”382     
After this article was largely complete, a copy of the “Contingency Plans” 
issued early during the Administration of William J. Clinton was made 
available.383  The Plan, which appears largely to have been prepared during 
the Reagan years and forwarded onward to subsequent administrations,384 
concludes that “the more persuasive legal arguments would leave authority 
in the Vice President until the four-day period had elapsed” although it 
prefaces that conclusion by terming it “uncertain” regarding who governs 
during the four-day period.385  Some of the uncertainty the Plan finds seems 
 
 378 See KALT, supra note 281, at 81 (suggesting that the Office of Legal Counsel of the justice department 
could help settle the issue with a public opinion confirming that the Vice President remains in power).   
 379 Memorandum from Theodore C. Olson, Assistant Att’y Gen., to the Att’y Gen. 2  (Apr. 3, 1981) 
(on file with the Office of Legal Counsel), available at https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/ 
files/digitallibrary/whormsubject/fg017/40-654-198419-fg017-177000-180999-2017.pdf. 
 380 Id. 
 381 Operation of the Twenty-fifth Amendment Respecting Presidential Succession, supra note 180, at 67. 
 382 Id. 
 383 OFFICE OF THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, CONTINGENCY PLANS—DEATH OR DISABILITY 
OF THE PRESIDENT (Mar. 16, 1993) [hereinafter CONTINGENCY PLANS], available at 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=twentyfifth_amendme
nt_executive_materials.  Thanks to Reb Brownell and John Rogan for obtaining this document and 
making it available.  See also KALT, supra note 281, at 81 (suggesting the Contingency Plan could 
clarify the situation by stating that the Vice President continues in power during the four-day period). 
 384 See Fred F. Fielding, Fordham Law Review Symposium Keynote Address, An Eyewitness Account of 
Executive “Inability,” 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 828–29 (2010) (describing Fielding’s work preparing 
the Contingency Plan during the Reagan administration and reporting his finding the Plan was still 
in use during the George W. Bush administration when he returned as White House counsel late 
in the second term). 
 385 See Temporary Disability of the President: Threshold Considerations, at 3, in CONTINGENCY PLANS (outlining 
procedures for temporarily transferring power from the President to Vice President when the 
President is unable to exercise the powers and duties of office).  
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to relate to  whether the President could resume during  the four-day period  
even if the Vice President and Cabinet indicated they did not contest the 
President’s “no inability” declaration.386  Memoranda from the Ford and 
Carter Administrations support the conclusion that the Vice President 
remains in power during the four-day period but find some uncertainty.387  
These executive branch documents tend to provide support for the 
proposition asserted here that the Vice President remains in power during 
the four-day period although stronger statements would be helpful and 
merited.  The Plan and some of the underlying documents are often 
conclusory and do not consider all of the pertinent arguments or evidence. 
Although the text, legislative record, and structural arguments make clear 
that the President does not resume power simply based on his “no inability” 
declaration, the President might resume before the four-day period is exhausted 
with, and only with, the appropriate acquiescence from the relevant executive 
branch officials.  The legislative history is overwhelming on this point388 and the 
 
 386 See, e.g., Temporary Disability of the President: Resumption of Authority by the President, at 3–4, in 
CONTINGENCY PLANS ( stating that even without considering a disagreement situation between the 
President, the Vice President/Cabinet majority as to the President’s ability to govern, “the question 
remains as to who governs during the four-day period following the President’s declaration that he 
again is able to perform the duties of his office,” and focusing its discussion on whether the President 
could resume during the four day period with the acquiescence of the Vice President/Cabinet). 
 387 See, e.g., 25th Amendment, August 21, 1975, at 5, in CONTINGENCY PLANS (concluding that “[t]he 
legislative history . . . indicates” the Vice President exercises presidential powers during four-day 
period but foresees “a feeling of serious uncertainty” which could be “debilitating”); Memorandum from 
Frank Wiggins to Mike Berman, at 4, in CONTINGENCY PLANS (stating that he was “fairly confident” a 
court would conclude that the Vice President remained in power during four-day period after having 
acknowledged some “uncertainty”).  The uncertainties in the 1975 document relate to the national 
mood given the unique circumstances, not the legal analysis, and would be inherent in the situation.  
Those in the Wiggins memorandum seem to rest on some misreading of the legislative record.  The 
author also states that his review of the congressional history was not “exhaustive.”  Id. at n.2.  A 
third memorandum from a political aide to Vice President Walter F. Mondale does not address the 
four-day issue but contains other mistakes.  Memorandum from Robert Torricelli to Michael Berman, March 
21, 1978, in CONTINGENCY PLANS.  I plan to discuss the Contingency Plan and some of the flaws in 
it and in the analysis of this and other points in a subsequent article. 
 388 See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 76, at 10 (statement of Acting Att’y Gen. Nicholas 
Katzenbach) (stating assumption that President could resume presidential powers immediately with 
concurrence of Vice President); 1965 House Hearings, supra note 110, at 99–100, 107 (statement of 
Att’y Gen. Nicholas Katzenbach) (reiterating assumption that President could immediately resume 
powers if Vice President agrees); id. at 243 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Herbert Brownell) 
(stating that President and Vice President could agree to the President resuming power before the 
waiting period expires); 111 CONG. REC. 3285 (1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that 
President and Vice President could agree to a shorter period of time); id. at 7939–40 (statement of 
Rep. Emanuel Celler) (explaining that the Vice President could agree that the President is no longer 
disabled and that therefore the President may resume his powers); id. (statement of Rep. Robert B. 
Duncan) (confirming, in exchange with Rep. Celler, that the Vice President could allow the 
President to resume the powers of his office); id. at 15,214 (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff) (“[I]t 
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logic of this conclusion is compelling.389  Section 4 prevents  a previously- 
declared disabled President from resuming power for four days, to allow the 
Vice President and Cabinet an opportunity to respond so as to preclude 
frustration of the Section 4 process and to minimize transfers.  These purposes 
do not apply once an authoritative determination independent of the President 
finds the President is fit to return to power.  The legislative history makes clear 
that the President does not have to wait the entire twenty-one-day period if 
Congress makes an earlier decision in his favor.390  That analogy would also 
support allowing the President to resume during the four-day period with the 
appropriate acquiescence from the appropriate executive branch officials. 
There is some uncertainty as to whether both the Vice President and 
Cabinet must agree with the President’s “no inability” declaration in order 
for the President to resume before the four days expire, or whether a decision 
by either the Vice President or the Cabinet majority to that effect would 
suffice.  Most of the comments in the legislative history suggested that the 
Vice President’s determination alone would be sufficient.391  Some of John 
Feerick’s writings at the time suggested that the President might resume 
earlier if she, the Vice President and Cabinet all agreed,392 although he did 
not discuss whether such an earlier presidential resumption might occur 
based on action by just the Vice President or Cabinet majority.  Feerick’s 
classic book on the subject states that “Either the Vice President alone or the 
Cabinet and Vice President can agree to the President’s taking over 
 
is not necessary that the President wait 4 days to resume his office if he and the Vice President 
mutually agree that he do so earlier.”); see also Feerick, supra note 124, at 200 (stating that President 
could resume before the four-day period upon agreement of President, Vice President and Cabinet); 
Feerick, supra note 203, at 917 (“[I]f [the Vice President and Cabinet] agreed with the President, 
the President would assume his powers and duties at the end of four days, or earlier if all agreed.”); 
Gustafson, supra note 166, at 469 n.41, 475 (stating that Vice President could return power during 
the four-day period to the President). 
 389 But see KALT, supra note 281, at 73 (arguing that allowing the President to resume powers and duties 
before the four-day period ends is “inconsistent with the whole idea of the mandatory waiting 
period.”). 
 390 See H.R. REP. NO. 89-564 at 4 (1965) (“A vote of less than two-thirds by either House would 
immediately authorize the President to assume the powers and duties of his office.”); 111 CONG. 
REC. 15,379 (1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (explaining that “[t]he 21 days need not always 
be used” and that earlier action in favor of the President would restore him to power immediately); 
see also FEERICK, supra note 10, at 120 (describing the twenty-one day limit as “an outside limitation” 
and identifying the Amendment’s intent as calling for as prompt action as possible with 
understanding that President would resume immediately upon action in his favor). 
 391 See supra note 388. 
 392 See e.g., Feerick, supra note 124, at 200 (stating that President could resume before the four-day 
period upon agreement of the President, Vice President and Cabinet); Feerick, supra note 203, at 
917 (“[I]f [the Vice President and Cabinet] agreed with the President, the President would assume 
his powers and duties at the end of four days, or earlier if all agreed.”). 
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immediately or at any time short of four days.”393  The legislative history 
specifically recognizes that a vote by either the House of Representatives or 
Senate in support of the President’s position before the twenty-one days 
expire would result in the President’s immediate resumption.394  That 
analogy might suggest that if either the Vice President or a Cabinet majority 
acquiesced in the President’s “no inability” determination during the four 
days he would resume power.  The Amendment does not state how the 
acquiescence of the Vice President and/or the Cabinet might be shown, but 
the use of public letters to the President pro tempore of the Senate and 
Speaker of the House of Representatives for other Section 4 communications 
implies that this vehicle would also be appropriate for this application. 
 Although the legislative record, structural considerations, and logic 
dictate that the President could resume before the four-day period elapsed 
with appropriate independent consent, the precise content of the necessary 
acquiescence is admittedly less certain.  Clearly acquiescence of both the 
Vice President and Cabinet majority would be sufficient and the legislative 
history overwhelmingly suggests that the Vice President’s agreement alone 
would suffice.  The twenty-one-day analogy suggests that Cabinet agreement 
alone would also work.  Fortunately, this area involves an extremely remote 
contingency—a disagreement between the Vice President and the Cabinet 
regarding whether the President is able to resume after they had previously 
determined her to be unable. 
The text, legislative record, and structural considerations leave no 
ambiguity that the Vice President continues to act as President a) during the 
four-day period allowed for the Vice President and Cabinet to respond to the 
President’s “no disability” declaration and, if they reassert their view that he 
is disabled, b) during the twenty-one-day period allowed for Congress to 
decide unless one house decides against the Vice President sooner but that c) 
the President can resume earlier with the appropriate acquiescence.  The 
structural reasoning behind this interpretation makes it even more 
compelling.  To construe the clause otherwise would allow a President who 
authoritative decision-makers had declared disabled to unilaterally return 
without any independent confirmation of his fitness, would allow him to 
disrupt the Section 4 procedure by discharging Cabinet members, and would 
increase the number of transfers of authority, thereby interfering with 
presidential continuity.  Many who have carefully studied this issue have 
 
 393 FEERICK, supra note 10, at 119. 
 394 See supra note 390. 
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reached this same conclusion.395 
III.  CONCLUSION  
The first fifty years of its history confirm what the framers of the Twenty-
fifth Amendment suspected.  Section 4 is likely to be used rarely.  Some 
potential uses may not be controversial when, for instance, a President is 
unconscious for a prolonged period of time.396  Yet, Section 4 was also 
created to address the most challenging instances of presidential inability, 
both contingencies its framers could foresee and those they could not 
anticipate.  They devised it to allow the transfer of presidential power and 
duties to the Vice President when a physical, mental, or other circumstance 
rendered the President incapacitated.  They recognized that some 
prospective uses of Section 4 might invite conflict, if, for instance, a President 
suffers from a mental illness that makes him or her “unable to discharge the 
powers and duties” of the presidency yet refuses to acknowledge that debility.   
 Section 4 exists to help ensure continuous presidential leadership during 
perilous times by a legitimate President or Vice President who is able to 
discharge the powers and duties of the presidency.  It is, accordingly, 
important that government officials and the public have a clear sense 
regarding Section 4 to inform their thinking when occasion arises for its use, 
especially if the circumstances present a contingency which invites conflict.  
To the extent commentary and explainer articles improperly depict 
Section 4 they may contribute to a misinformed public and government and 
even provide material for demagogic leaders and their acolytes to misuse in 
the future to complicate the process. 
 
 395 See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 10, at 118–19; Gustafson, supra note 166, at 468–69 (stating that Vice 
President remains in power during the four-day period); Second Fordham University School of Law 
Clinic, supra note 7, at 925; RAYMOND J. CELADA, LIBRARY OF CONG. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE 
SERV., PRESIDENTIAL CONTINUITY AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL VACANCY AMENDMENT LRS-9  
(1965) (“However, if the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet felt that the President was 
unable, they could prevent the President from resuming the powers and duties of the office by 
transmitting their written declaration so stating to the Congress.”); id. at LRS-23 (“Pending the 
decision [by Congress], the Vice President is to continue as Acting President.”); Joel Goldstein, Trump 
Opponents Have Rediscovered the 25th Amendment.  Here Is What You Should Know About It, WASH. POST (June 
7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/07/5-things-you-
should-know-about-the-25th-amendment/?utm_term=.6eb478ccd9c0 (“The amendment and its 
history make clear that the vice president continues to act as president during both the four-day 
waiting period and the 21-day deliberation period” unless either the appropriate executive officials 
or at least a house of Congress sooner supports the President’s position); cf. KALT, supra note 281, at 
74 (concluding that Vice President is to remain in power during the four-day period). 
 396 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 224, at 196.  
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The Twenty-fifth Amendment, including Section 4, was the product of a 
lengthy effort to address gaps in America’s provisions to ensure presidential 
continuity.397  The Amendment, especially Section 4, cannot be properly 
appraised or grasped through a quick consideration.  In addition to its text, 
the historical context, legislative record and structural considerations must 
be studied to appreciate it design, the purposes animating its provisions, the 
way in which it is to operate, and the contribution it can make. 
The Amendment, its architects conceded, is imperfect.  They pursued it 
nonetheless because they correctly concluded that it was an enormous 
improvement on the status quo which, among other problems, impeded 
action when a President was disabled.  Its adoption represented an enormous 
step forward.  That becomes evident when its history and record are studied. 
It is easy, as some have done, to disparage Section 4 as “ambiguous.”  Yet, 
greater precision would have made adoption less likely by inviting complaints 
that its treatment of marginal matters was over-inclusive or under-inclusive.  
Such a result would have left constitutional provisions in the unsatisfactory 
state they were in, a status quo that was even less palatable during a nuclear 
age.  Of course, predictability has its appeal where possible, but life is full of 
uncertainty and sometimes flexible formulations present the wiser course in 
order to allow future decision-makers the ability to respond to problems that 
may arise with unanticipated twists.  The Amendment’s architects recognized 
that defining presidential disability with a bright-line standard would 
inevitably be too rigid to address unforeseen contingencies the future would 
present.  Rather than attempt an approach they suspected would prove 
under-inclusive, they provided a standard with intended flexibility.  On other 
occasions, they deliberately fashioned extensive legislative history to clarify 
various terms and procedures in the reasonable understanding that later 
generations would consult and rely upon the purposes, understandings, and 
meanings their preserved discussions disclosed. 
Not all of the mistakes about Section 4 in journalistic literature are of equal 
consequence.  Some may be due to inelegant phrasing in short commentary 
or explainer pieces or to word constraints that provide inadequate space to 
cover a complicated subject rather than to substantive misunderstanding.  
Those which misstate the scope of Section 4, by  suggesting that it does not 
apply to mental disabilities or that it only applies  when the President is unable 
to communicate an inability, are more serious distortions.  Although the 
 
 397 See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 10, at 49–121 (providing historical discussion of development of the 
Amendment); Goldstein, supra note 9, at 963–68, 998–1013 (discussing context and legislative 
efforts that gave rise to the Amendment); Goldstein, supra note 104, at 1138–40 (discussing 
Amendment as example of bipartisan legislative achievement). 
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provision was not intended as a means to declare no confidence in a President 
simply because his policies were unpopular, it was intended to cover a wide 
variety of situations in which the constitutional decision-makers found him 
unable to discharge presidential powers and duties given the context 
presented.  Similarly, mischaracterizations regarding who exercises power 
during the four-day period are potentially serious.  The text, the legislative 
record and structural arguments together make clear that the Vice President 
exercises powers during the four-day period.  Nonetheless, an unprincipled 
politician might attempt that argument and he or she and their journalistic 
acolytes might draw from mistakes previously made on the Internet.   
A careful study of the legislative record would avoid many mistakes 
regarding Section 4.  That is certainly true of the statements that diminished 
the role of presidential inability in the Amendment, suggested that mental 
inability was not a focus, excluded from coverage situations where a 
conscious President was unwilling to declare her inability, questioned who 
were the “principal heads of the executive departments,” or concluded that 
the President would resume power immediately based on his or her “no 
inability” declaration.   
Of course, it is a rare journalist who has the time to study the three sets 
of legislative hearings and the Senate and House debates (not to mention the 
relevant history before 1964) before writing a 750-word commentary or 
explainer piece about whether Section 4 could be invoked against President 
Trump or any other President.  They might fairly rely on scholarly experts 
on the subject to provide background regarding the Amendment.    
And it is surely too much to expect every academic to study the full 
legislative materials before producing his or her own commentary piece, 
much less responding to a journalist’s phone call or e-mail.  Experts on the 
presidency, on American politics or history or constitutional law, or other 
subjects may enhance public discussion of the applicability of Section 4 by 
the insights their scholarship in related fields allows them to contribute even 
if they have not written or taught about the Twenty-fifth Amendment.  Many  
who have contributed to the discussion have accordingly deepened the 
discussion.  Yet, most of the mistakes addressed here could have been 
avoided by anyone who read the pertinent pages of either John Feerick’s The 
Twenty-fifth Amendment: Its Complete History and Applications or his 1965 Fordham 
Law Review article explaining the Amendment.  It does not seem too much to 
expect someone writing or commenting on the Amendment to have at least 
consulted that classic work before offering expert analysis. 
When mistakes are made, it is worth correcting them to avoid later 
confusion.  Some articles regarding Section 4 acknowledge having made 
mistakes and have corrected them.  Although initial readers may be 
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misinformed, one advantage of modern technology is that the permanent 
digital version can carry a correction with the article in question.  Whereas 
mistakes in printed media remained forever and the subsequent corrections 
were often hard to connect, error can now be acknowledged and eliminated 
so that only the corrected version endures.  Scholars can play a constructive 
role by calling these mistakes to the attention of the author or platform.  My 
few efforts in this regard suggest that sometimes they are appreciated (and 
other times ignored). 
Ultimately, Section 4 may present some difficult questions, including 
instances where people in good faith reach different conclusions.  That is 
inevitable.  It is hoped, however, that such discussions will proceed with an 
appreciation of the contribution Section 4 and the rest of the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment have made and the challenges its architects faced, and an 
understanding of Section 4’s history, scope, and operation.  That, after all, 
should be among the takeaways of its golden jubilee.  
